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Tiivistelmä 
 
IMO:n kehittämä Polarkoodi on tullut voimaan vuoden 2017 alussa. Se tuo mukanaan 
lisää vaatimuksia, jotka koskevat polaari alueiden aluksia. Arktisilla ja Antarktisilla vesillä 
liikuttaessa kylmyys, jää ja infrastruktuurin puute lisäävät riskejä. Uudet vaatimukset on 
tarkoitettu ennaltaehkäisemään riskejä, sekä parantamaan onnettomuudesta selviyty-
mistä lisäämällä vaatimuksia laivan suunnitteluun ja varusteluun. Polarkoodi asettaa 
myös lisävaatimuksia ympäristön suojeluun. Polarkoodi velvoittaa kaikkia aluksia, joilla 
operoidaan Arktisilla tai Antarktisilla alueilla, hankkimaan ’Polar Water Certificate’ -to-
distuksen joka todistaa laivan ja sen miehistön täyttävän Polarkoodin vaatimukset. 
 
Tämä tutkimus keskittyy Polarkoodin neljänteen lukuun, joka koskee laivan vakavuutta 
ja osastointia. Tutkimuksen aihe kattaa kaksi sääntöä: ehjän laivan vakavuus jään kerty-
misen seurauksena, sekä vaurioituneen laivan vakavuus jään aiheuttaman vaurion 
vuoksi. Tutkimuksen tarkoitus on (1) käsitellä molempien sääntöjen taustoja ja historiaa, 
(2) kehittää laskentatyökalu sääntöjen mukaisten tilanteiden luomiseen ja laskentaan ja 
(3) analysoida vakavuus sääntöjen vaikutusta tapaustutkimuksen avulla. Jotkin Polar-
koodin säännöt ovat monitulkintaisia ja ennakkotapauksia tulkinnoista ei ole julkisesti 
saatavilla. Tästä syystä tutkimus tarjoaa tulkintatavan vauriovakavuus -säännölle, jotta 
laskentatyökalun kehitys on mahdollista. Työ antaa myös laajemman kuvan Polarkoodin 
muista vaatimuksista, keskittyen kuitenkin pääasiassa vakavuussääntöihin. 
 
Onnettomuuden seuraukset ovat luonnollisesti vakavampia niille laivoille jotka ei ole täy-
sin Polarkoodin mukaisia, kuin niille jotka on suunniteltu täysin sen mukaisesti. Vau-
riovakavuutta koskeva sääntö ei ole pakollinen olemassa oleville laivoille. Tämän vuoksi 
vauriovakavuuden tapaustutkimus onkin mielenkiintoinen olemassa oleville laivoille, 
paljastaen miten tällainen laiva selviäisi Polarkoodin mukaisesta jäävauriosta. 
 
Työn tuloksena säännöt ja niiden vaikutus esimerkkilaivoihin selviää. Jään kertymisen 
arvot ovat alun perin tarkoitettu kalastusaluksille, mutta ovat kohtuullisia myös 
isommille aluksille. Vauriovakavuuden suhteen selkeää selitystä jäävaurion mitoille ei 
löytynyt, mutta käytetyt mitat ovat tutkimuksen mukaan riittävät. Tässä työssä kehitetyt 
menetelmät jään kertymisen ja relevanttien jäävaurioiden luomiseen mahdollistivat 
tapaustutkimukset, joiden perusteella jään kertyminen ei ole riski tutkituille aluksille. 
Jäävauriot puolestaan osoittautuivat kriittisiksi tutkitulle, SOLAS 2009 mukaisesti 
suunnitellulle risteilijälle jonka 1589 relevantista vauriosta 13 ei toteuttanut Polarkoodin 
vaatimusta vauriovakavuudelle. 
 
Avainsanat Polarkoodi, vauriovakavuus, jäävaurio, ehjän laivan vakavuus,  jään kertyminen  
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Abstract 
 
The Polar Code developed by IMO became in to force at the beginning of 2017. It brings more 
requirements for ships navigating in the polar waters where coldness, floating ice and 
remoteness to infrastructure poses special risks compared to open waters. The new 
requirements are focusing to accident prevention and survivability after accident with the 
means of proper ship design, crew skills and survival equipment. Polar Code requires also 
methods for the protection of polar environment. Polar Code requires all ships that are 
intended to navigate at the polar waters to have Polar Water Certificate, which proves that the 
ship and its crew fulfils the relevant requirements. 
 
This study focuses on the chapter four of the Polar Code, concerning ship stability and 
subdivision. The topic covers two requirements: intact stability due to icing and damage 
stability due to ice-related damage. The aim of this thesis is to (1) assess the background of 
these requirements to enlighten where these requirements come from, (2) develop calculation 
tools for studying these stability scenarios and (3) analyse the effect of the stability 
requirements with example cases. The interpretation of Polar Code is still somewhat unclear 
due to ambiguous phrasing and lack of precedent cases. The thesis offers a way for interpreting 
the damage stability requirement. This selection of interpretation is needed for the calculation 
tool. In addition, this thesis provides overall view on Polar Code requirements, but focusing 
mainly on the stability requirements. 
 
The risk of accident at polar waters is naturally higher with existing ships that are not in 
accordance with all Polar Code’s requirements. The damage stability requirement is not 
mandatory for existing ships, whereas the icing rule is. Thus analysing a pre-Polar Code ship 
contributes interesting results since the Polar Code’s damage stability case is not taken into 
account when existing ships are designed and built. However it is possible for existing 
passenger ship to acquire polar ship certificate and start cruising in the polar areas, and in the 
worst case experience ice-related damage. 
 
As a result of the work the rules and their effect on studied ships is revealed. Ice accretion 
vales are originated from fishing vessel rules, but are adequate for larger ships. The 
background of extents used in ice damage remained unsolved. However the extents revealed 
to reasonable. The developed tool worked as intended and enabled case studies. The case 
studies indicated that icing is not big risk for existing ships. However, the studied SOLAS 2009 
design passenger was revealed to be vulnerable for ice related damages in 13 of 1589 damage 
scenarios that fulfil the damage extents as defined in Polar Code. 
 
Keywords Polar Code, damage stability, intact stability, ice damage, icing  
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Acronyms 
 
A  Attained index 
𝐴𝐷1  Area of the calculation section below the deck in question 
𝐴𝐷1  Area of the calculation section above the deck in question 
𝐴𝑠  Partial attained index for deepest subdivision draught 
𝐴𝑝  Partial attained index for partial subdivision draught 
𝐴𝑙  Partial attained index for light service draught 
B Breath of the ship is the extreme width from outside of frame to 
outside of frame at or below the deepest subdivision load line 
CoG General expression for center of gravity 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑑  Center of gravity of deck in question, also known as centroid 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴1 Center of gravity the calculation section below the deck in 
question, also known as centroid 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴2 Center of gravity the calculation section above the deck in 
question, also known as centroid 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑛  Center of gravity the ice accumulated on ship, where n=(X,Y,Z) 
GM  Metacentric height 
GZ Righting arm lever, horizontal distance between the lines of 
buoyancy and gravity 
𝐺𝑍𝑚𝑋  Maximum positive righting lever, in meters, up to the angle 𝜃𝑉  
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛  Center of gravity coordinate n of the all exposed deck areas 
combined, where n=(X,Y,Z) 
𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐼  Notation for GZ curve  
𝐾  Constant used in calculation of 𝑠𝑖, depending on ship type and 𝜃𝑒  
L Length of ship is the length measured between perpendiculars 
taken at the extremities of the deepest subdivision load line 
𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛  Center of gravity coordinate n of the lateral projection of the ship, 
where n=(X,Y,Z) 
Length pp Length between perpendiculars 
LOA Length overall 
𝑁  𝑁1 + 2𝑁2 
𝑁1  Number of persons for whom lifeboats are provided 
𝑁2 Number of persons (including officers and crew) the ship is 
permitted to carry in excess of 𝑁1 
R  Required index, generic entry 
𝑅 Value of R as calculated in accordance with the equation in 
subparagraph 2.2 in SOLAS Regulation 6 
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𝑅0 Value of R as calculated in accordance with the equation in 
subparagraph 2.1 in SOLAS Regulation 6 
UIWL Upper ice waterline of the ship 
X X-axis of right-handed coordinate system, positive direction fore 
Y  Y-axis of right-handed coordinate system, positive direction port 
Z  Z-axis of right-handed coordinate system, positive direction up 
𝑖  Index of compartment or group of compartments under 
 consideration 
𝑚𝑙   Ice mass on the lateral projection 
𝑚𝑑   The ice mass on all exposed decks 
𝑝𝑖 Probability that only the compartment or group of compartments 
under consideration may be flooded 
𝑠𝑖  Probability of survival after flooding the compartment 
𝜃𝑒  Equilibrium heel angle in any stage of flooding, in degrees 
𝜃𝑉  Angle, in any stage of flooding, where the righting lever 
becomes negative, or the angle at which an opening incapable 
of being closed weathertight becomes submerged 
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ABS  American Bureau of Shipping (Classification society) 
BV  Bureau Veritas (Classification society) 
CCS  China Classification Society  
DNV  Det Norske Veritas (Classification society) 
DB  Double bottom 
FTA  Finnish Transportation Agency 
FSICR  Finnish-Swedish Ice Class Rules 
GL  Germanischer Lloyd (Classification society) 
IACS International Association of Classification Societies  
IMCO Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Name 
changed in 1982 to IMO) 
IMO  International maritime organization 
IS CODE  The Code on Intact Stability  
KRS  Korean Register of Shipping  
LBMA  Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs 
LR  Lloyd’s Register (Classification society) 
LRK  Laivanrakentajain kerho (Ship builders’ club) 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships 
NAPA  Naval Architecture Package, ship design software by NAPA Ltd. 
NKK  Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Classification society) 
OSV  Offshore supply vessel  
OTKES  Onnettomuustukintakeskus/Finnish agency for accident research 
PRS  Polski Rejestr Statków (Classification society) 
Relevant damage case Possible damage case, fulfilling Polar Code damage extents 
RINA  Registro Italiano Navale (Classification society) 
RMRS  Russian Maritime Register of Shipping  
SOLAS  International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
TRAFI  Finnish transportation agency
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1
 Background 
 
Navigating in ice-covered waters has been part of shipping for centuries. The navigation 
in these conditions started by ice strengthened sailboats that were even capable of ice 
breaking in some extent. Before this, the indigenous people of the arctic regions have 
been exploring these areas in search for food and other resources. (Arctic council 2009)  
Norwegian sailboat FRAM was one of the first purpose built ships intended especially 
for polar explorations with its round and strong wooden hull. Purpose of the round hull 
was to lift the ship on top of the ice as the ice pressure increased along the hull. The hull 
was made to more than 50 cm thick to withstand the ice pressure, but also to insulate the 
hull. (Nansen 1897) Under the command of Fridtjof Nansen on 1893-1896, expedition 
group intended to freeze the ship into the polar ice in the eastern Arctic Ocean, and then 
let the trans-polar current slowly drift the ship towards the geographical North Pole. 
Attempt failed, as the FRAM and the crew did not reach the pole solely by drifting with 
the ice, but the interest towards arctic waters kept increasing. Already on 1878, Adolf 
Erik Nordenskjold was the first to navigate through the Northeast Passage with his 
sailboat Vega that also had small 20-horse power steam engine in addition to its sails to 
push forward (Blåfield 2016). The Northwest Passage remained undiscovered until 1906 
when another Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen managed find the way to the Pacific 
on his three-winter-long expedition (Arctic Council 2009).  
 
Engine-powered ice going ships have been purposely built for ice breaking since 1837 as 
the city of Philadelphia ordered a ship, named City Ice Boat No. 1, capable of breaking 
ice and keeping city port and Delaware river open during cold winters. The City Ice Boat 
No. 1 was operational until 1917 thus having operational life of 80 years (Oesterle 1988). 
Icebreakers have been the primary way for navigating through ice and making channels 
for commercial vessels trough the 20th century, ensuring that people and goods are 
moving even in difficult ice conditions.  
 
From the late 20th century until today, the trend has been going towards more 
independently moving ice going vessels. In the polar waters, continuous or even irregular 
icebreaker assistance is not always available. Thus vessels need to be designed in a way 
that they can navigate more independently trough ice covered waters, using for example 
double-acting ship concept, where bow is designed for open water and the stern is shaped 
for ice breaking purposes, allowing typically cargo ships to sail more independently on 
ice infested waters. (Juurmaa et al. 2001) (Kujala & Riska 2010) 
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Figure 1. City Ice Boat No. 1 (Wikimedia/Edward O. Clark) 
 
Navigation in open seas and shipbuilding did not have any common rules up until 1912. 
Safety of ship designs were on the responsibility shipyards and naval architects’ personal 
experience. In 1912 passenger ship RMS Titanic encountered an iceberg collision where 
1517 lives were lost. This accident raised international concerns about safe ship designs, 
and thus uniform rules were introduced to shipbuilding to increase the safety of ship 
operations and enable safer ship design at shipyards worldwide. This was the starting 
point for the international convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, noted hereafter as 
SOLAS, which is international agreement obligating flag states to ensure that ships under 
their flag are fulfilling the safety requirements. In short, SOLAS agreement requirements 
concerns ships’ construction, equipment and operation at sea. (IMO 2014). Original 
SOLAS treaty was focused on lifeboat capacity and other safety equipment since many 
lives could have been saved in the RMS Titanic’s accident if there would have been 
enough lifeboats. Later SOLAS introduced also requirements for other parts of ship 
design such as structures and stability.  
 
The damage stability requirements were introduced first time on 1948 as SOALS included 
regulation 7 under chapter 2, regarding “Stability of Ships in Damaged Condition”. The 
rule covered deterministic damage cases of up to two adjacent compartments. (IMCO 
1948) Damage stability rules were later updated on 1974 to include more detailed 
deterministic damage scenario having predetermined longitudinal extent (IMO 1974). In 
1990 SOLAS was updated to take account also stages of flooding (IMO 1990). Latest 
major change in SOLAS stability regulations is the introduction of probabilistic damage 
stability concept which focuses on probabilities on the risks of operation, damage location 
and survival after damage. The approach of probabilistic damage stability is generally 
seen to represents the rationalized and harmonized way of damage stability that has 
become more and more feasible method since the development of computation in the 
current millennia. (Francescutto & Papanikolaou 2010) 
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Intact stability considerations were introduced for the first time in SOLAS in year 1974 
as chapter 6 included regulation 4 “Intact stability requirements”. The rules introduced 
requirements concerning grain shift, area under GZ curve and minimum GM value 
accounting free surface effect (IMCO 1974). However research on intact stability of ships 
was already on some parts on that level almost two decades earlier, as Rahola (1939) 
determined limits for minimum stability in his studies. The intact stability rules were later 
updated on 1991 to include also assessment of intact stability under high winds and 
parametric rolling (IMO MSC.22(59)). Major update on 2008 introduced a CODE ON 
INTACT STABILITY to summarize intact stability rules under one set of rules. It also 
introduced new optional requirements concerning effects of free surfaces, icing and 
watertight integrity (IMO 2008). 
 
The new IMO (International Maritime Organization) regulation ‘International code for 
ships operating in polar waters’, or ‘Polar Code’ as used here after, aims to continue this 
evolution of safe ship design and operational safety before the worst happens. Increasing 
interest towards shorter passages between Europe and Asia, as well as Eastern parts of 
North America and Asia will rise the change of an accident at Polar waters. The cruise 
industry is also seeking new opportunities from expedition cruises more extensively as 
demand for this type of cruises is rising. The Polar Code guides how to consider the 
special climate conditions in ship design and safety measures. Possibly the most 
dominating features of these harsh areas are very cold temperature and remoteness of 
infrastructure. (Arctic council 2009)  
 
As the number of ships designed for the operations in the arctic waters will likely 
increase in the future, safe design of ships is necessary (Ihalainen 2017). This safe 
design of ships is especially important for the safety of passenger ships where large 
number of people are onboard. Another big concern and reason for the new safety 
regulations in the Polar areas is the protection of the environment from all external 
substances that may end up in the water. Remoteness and cold climate makes cleaning 
of these areas from accidents very difficult. Previously there was no uniform rules or 
even any mandatory requirements for ship design and operations, as each country in the 
area had their own rules for navigation in ice covered seas. Canada, Russia and Baltic 
Sea area have relatively long traditions in shipbuilding and ship operations in ice 
covered waters, before Polar Code came in to force, nothing could have stopped for 
example some non-experienced shipbuilder to build a vessel for these areas with open 
water design. Even though such attempt would be irrational and the vessel would not 
necessarily not receive icebreaker assistance as quickly as an ice going vessel in areas 
with local ice rules. Sailing international ice infested waters with incapable ship would 
be even more irrational. 
 
Polar Code aims to unify the rules so it is clearer to determine the requirements for ship 
design. A ship that fulfills the Polar Code requirements can have the Polar Ship 
Certificate to prove that the ship in question is capable for operations in the special and 
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demanding environmental conditions of the polar waters. With this certificate, the ship’s 
insurance is valid for to the environmental conditions described by the certificate, as 
Polar Code divides ships in to three categories depending the severity of possible ice 
conditions. 
 
Modern ice-going ships are usually designed in respect to IACS (International 
Association of Classification Societies) polar class requirements to have certain polar -
ice class. These classes define in how harsh ice conditions the ship can operate safely. 
The aim of these structural and equipment rules by IACS is that the ship will not confront 
severe structural damages in the ice conditions to which the ship has been designed. The 
IACS rules do not comment the situation where the damage happens, meaning that the 
values and equations in the IACS polar class requirements are explained in the rule text 
to give clear idea how the rules need to be implemented in ship design to assure that the 
ship will survive in the ice conditions it is designed. Figure 2 illustrates modern ice 
breaker Polaris, delivered in 2016 and built into Polar Class 4 (PC-4). Polaris has ice 
breaking capability to sail through at least 1.8 meters thick ice as designed. (FTA 2014) 
 
 
Figure 2. Modern icebreaker Polaris, ice class PC-4 (Aker Arctic 2017). 
 
The Polar Code is linked to the IACS polar class requirements in so that the IACS polar 
classes can be used to define into which category a ship will be included when interpreting 
the Polar Code. In Polar Code, ships are divided into three categories based on their 
intended operational area and capability. The category has effect on how the Polar Code 
is applied for a ship. For example, the damage stability requirements concern category A 
and B ships but not category C ships. The category of a ship is thus one key parameter 
dividing polar ships by their capability of navigation in polar waters. The operational area 
has big effect how likely ice related damages are. The risk is higher in colder areas where 
ice concentration is higher and encountering of multiyear ice is more likely. The cause 
for the accident can be for example human error or underestimation of the environmental 
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circumstances. Unexpected multiyear ice or shallow water may lie in ships path because 
of uncharted waters and lack of reliable ice charts and accurate weather forecasts. (Arctic 
council 2009) Approximately only 10% of the Arctic have accurate navigational charts 
that have been produced with precision mapping methods such as continuous bottom 
profiling and vessel position recording with satellite positioning. (Canadian Coast Guard 
2012) The satellite imaging is not capable of providing as highly detailed images of the 
sea and ice as it is in higher latitudes. The weather system/forecasting is also not as 
accurate as in more used sea and land areas since there is not that long experience and 
history of weather forecasting in these remote areas. (Orimolade et al. 2016) 
 
1.2
 Recent accident at the polar waters 
 
Increasing interest and traffic at polar waters rises the risk of accidents at these areas. 
Before year 2017 no international rule concerned specifically the special operational areas 
of Arctic and Antarctic waters, controlling what kind of vessels are allowed to navigate 
there. To highlight the importance of Polar Code and provide understanding about 
accident scenarios at these polar waters, two accident cases are introduced here. One 
concerning an old passenger ship navigating at Antarctic and the second case concerning 
a cargo vessel operating in the Arctic waters at Northwest Passage. 
 
1.2.1 Sinking of the MV Explorer, 2007 
 
In 2007 passenger vessel Explorer, built in 1969 to 1A1 ICE-A class, sank in the Antarctic 
waters after a collision with ice ridge. The main reason for the accident was captain’s 
wrong estimation about the ice conditions, as he thought it was first year ice, but in reality, 
there was also hard land ice among the first year ice. Another reason for sinking, after the 
impact with ice ridge had made approximately 3.1m long breach to the hull, was that a 
watertight door between compartments leaked and allowed the water to gradually flood 
into two watertight compartments. The ship was designed to survive only one-
compartment damages as the rules required at the time (LBMA 2009). The ship had 
history of over 250 Antarctic voyages, which displays that the Explorer was in some level 
suitable for operations in polar waters. (LBMA 2009)  
 
The Explorer’s damage case is interesting especially from the ice class and ship’s 
capabilities point-of-view. The ship was built in 1969 according to DNV 1A1 ICE-A class 
rules and it retained that class through its service as the classification regulations allowed 
to remain the old ice class notation, even though the requirements for ice going ships 
renewed and higher standards were introduced. (LBMA 2009)  (DNV 2011) In this case, 
one main requirement that has been renewed in the classification system regarding ice 
strengthening from the 1969, is the determination of adequate plate thickness. The shell 
plate thickness in Explorer was 13 mm in the whole hull which was one millimeter more 
than the minimum thickness of 12 mm required for 1A1 ICE-A class. In addition, the hull 
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of Explorer was single hull design. At that time the thickness of plates and scantlings was 
determined as a percentage increase from normal open water class rules in the Explorer 
and other ships prior to year 1971, as the approach of design ice loads was not yet 
introduced as a class rule. To give some perspective, for example Finnish-Swedish ice 
rules would require at least 18.8 mm plate thickness in the bow-area for the Explorer if it 
would be built in 2017 to lowest 1C Finnish-Swedish ice class. (Trafi 2010a) The plate 
thickness calculation is carried out with 0.5 meter transversal frame spacing to obtain the 
result of 18.8 mm. 
 
The case of Explorer displays very well two things. Firstly, even if the design is done at 
the time of construction according to best current knowledge, it may not be sufficient in 
reality for its purpose as the time passes and operational areas change. Secondly, human 
errors are hard to avoid as the sea conditions in certain areas vary greatly from year to 
year and even in the matter of hours. To overcome these problems related to estimation 
of ice conditions, faster and more reliable information of ice conditions needs to be 
available for ships at sea. (Arctic council 2009) 
 
 
Figure 3. MV Explorer sinking at Antarctic water in 2007. (Wikiedia/Jahn, R 2007) 
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1.2.2 Sinking of the MS Finnpolaris, 1991 
 
MS Finnpolaris, built to ice class 1A (in accordance to FSICR), sank on 11.08.1991 
nearby Disco bay at the coast of Greenland. (OTKES 2002) Finnpolaris was carrying 
zinc-ore as it sailed through a seaway that was ice infested with floes. The weather at the 
time of the incident was foggy with approximately maximum of 7-8 m/s winds and 5 m 
high waves. Suddenly a wave slammed a bergy-bit -sized piece of ice to the starboard 
side hull and captain reported the ship started to heel very rapidly. The bergy-bit 
punctured the hull so that the cargo hold flooded and water mixed with zinc-ore. Due to 
the heeling of the ship, the portside lifeboat was not possible to be used, leavign only one 
of the two lifeboats usable. 15 hours from the ice impact, the Finnpolaris was completely 
sank. All crew was rescued approximately 7 hours after the accident, as oil tanker Sofie 
Teresa was closest to the scene of the accident. The rescue time was quite critical aspect 
in this accident case because the life boat the crew used was open-top model, so the crew 
was in directly exposed to the weather. At the time of the rescue, some of the crew 
members were already so exhausted that they could not climb onboard of the rescue vessel 
with their own strength. (High Seas Rescue 2000). Figure 4 illustrates the sea and weather 
conditions after the collision with ice. 
 
The rescue operation of the crew was supported by the Canadian coast guard as their 
aircraft was already in the air and in the range when the M/S Finnpolaris sent distress call. 
The coordinates and navigational aid from the aircraft gave the oil tanker Sofie Teresa 
important information where to take course. As the captain of the MT Sofie Teresa 
explains in the document (High Seas Rescue 2000), it is very difficult to estimate the best 
route in ice, only with the observations made from the bridge of the ship. 
 
 
Figure 4. MS Finnpolaris sinking (High Seas Rescue 2000). 
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1.3
 Polar Code in general 
 
The new Polar Code has come into effect on 01.01.2017. Its purpose is to give instructions 
and guidance for ship operations and safe ship design for vessels that are intended to 
operate in the waters near the polar areas. All of the Polar Code regulations will be valid 
for ships that are constructed after the Polar Code has become into effect. It is intended 
to supplement the existing IACS polar class system that considers in more detail the 
structural requirements, and is aimed solely for ship designers. Polar Code’s purpose is 
to give more general view of the environment and safety risks that need to be taken into 
account in ship design and when operating in the Polar Regions. Its requirements and 
aspects are also provided for the crew onboard. (Polar Code)  
 
Polar Code defines three different ship categories dividing polar ships by their intended 
operational ice conditions. It is worth noticing that Polar Code does not have requirements 
for ice braking capability, but determination of the categories is linked to ice classes. The 
different categories are presented below as described in the Polar Code (IMO 2015a): 
 
- Category A ship means a ship designed for operation in polar waters in at least medium first-
year ice, which may include old ice inclusions.  
 
- Category B ship means a ship not included in category A, designed for operation in polar 
waters in at least thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions.  
 
- Category C ship means a ship designed to operate in open water or in ice conditions less severe 
than those included in categories A and B. 
 
The IACS polar ice class system can describe the category A and B ships by the use of 
steel grade and amount used in the structures. Category A ship’s structures need to follow 
the requirements intended for IACS polar classes 1-5 and category B ships polar classes 
6-7. For category C ships the Polar Code states (IMO 2015a): 
 
“…scantlings of ice strengthened category C ships shall be approved by the 
Administration, or a recognized organization accepted by it, taking into account 
acceptable standards adequate for the ice types and concentrations encountered in the 
area of operation; and a category C ship need not be ice strengthened if, in the opinion 
of the Administration, the ship's structure is adequate for its intended operation.” 
 
This leaves more possibilities for interpretation in the design of category C ships, which 
may include pure open water ships or ships with ice class lower than IACS polar class 7. 
These lower classes can be for example FSICR 1B and 1C ice classes which are capable 
to operate in medium to easy ice condition at Baltic Sea, meaning 0.6 and 0.4 meters of 
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sea ice. However also these classes are vulnerable for multiyear ice, as the recent accident 
cases proved that even higher ice classes may sink due to impact on such hard ice. 
The ship categories give also more indication how Polar Code is linked to the IACS polar 
ice class system that was adopted 1st of July in 2007 to divide ships according to the 
capability how thick ice the hull can withstand and break as the ship is moving in the ice. 
This can be seen also as a reason for ship owners to build their vessels according to IACS 
ice class rules so that comparison of vessels is more straightforward than with ships that 
follow local ice rules or some other design requirements. Another reason for the use of 
IACS ice class rules is that having a common way of ship design, the resale value of the 
vessel is potentially higher since it is easier for other ship owners to assess the ship’s 
capabilities with the common reference system. 
 
The Polar Code is divided into two main parts: A and B. The part A includes all mandatory 
regulations and part B includes the recommendatory provisions to extend part A. Both A 
and B are sub-divided into sections I and II. Part I focuses on requirements for safe design 
of the ship and safety equipment onboard. The part II focuses on pollution prevention. 
 
The contents of the Polar Code is aimed to increase the maritime safety in the harsh and 
environmentally delegate polar waters. (IMO 2015a) The polar waters in question are 
defined as in SOLAS regulations XIV/1.2 and XIV/1.3 and also by MARPOL Annex I, 
regulations 1.11.7 and 46.2; Annex II, regulations 13.8.1 and 21.2; Annex IV, regulations 
17.2 and 17.3; and Annex V, regulations 1.14.7 and 13.2 (IMO 2014) (IMO 2015b. The 
areas of polar waters in question are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6 below. Ships 
operating in these areas must follow the requirements of the Polar Code, however the 
areas in the charts are for illustrative purposes only and the final estimation of sea 
conditions is on the responsibility of ship captain. 
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Figure 5. Area of Arctic waters in northern hemisphere. (IMO 2015a) 
 
 
Figure 6. Area of Antarctic waters in southern hemisphere. (IMO 2015a) 
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Polar Code gives also instructions on various areas of ship design and operations. These 
topics include ship structures, subdivision and stability, water and weather tight integrity, 
machinery, fire safety, life-saving systems such as life boats, safety of navigation and 
communication, voyage planning and crew duties on board and crew training. These 
cover all the aspects that can be affected by cold the climate and remoteness to 
infrastructure. Polar Code’s chapter 4, concerning subdivision and stability, includes the 
stability requirements for damage and intact stability scenarios. These rules states the 
measures for the damage length, height and penetration and icing allowances for intact 
stability part.  
 
With the damage dimensions, all relevant damage cases are identified. These damage 
cases has to cover all different combinations of compartments that can be flooded based 
on the location of the damage. Damage length and height are obtained as a certain 
percentage of ships particulars. The penetration of the damage is a fixed value for all sized 
ships, being 0.76 meters. It is worth of noticing already here that the Polar Code does not 
state that smaller damage cases should be studied. In addition, Polar Code does not state 
weather simultaneous icing and ice-related damage should be studied. 
 
The intact stability part of the Polar Code takes into account the accumulation of ice on 
the ship’s exposed external structures. The amount of accumulated ice is determined by 
the vertical and lateral areas of exposed superstructure. The rule sets certain mass-per-
area value for these exposed ship structures and guides that ships should be designed so 
that icing of the structures is minimized. 
 
1.4
 Scope of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the stability chapter, CHAPTER 4 –SUBDIVISION 
AND STABILITY, of the Polar Code in terms of intact and damage stability. The goal 
related to damage stability is to create new NAPA software tool to identify the relevant 
damage cases and analyze the effects of these damage scenarios on ship stability with an 
example ship model as a case study. The goal for the intact stability part of the Polar 
Code, is to create a NAPA software tool to account the icing on the lateral and horizontal 
ship structures. With the help of this tool it is possible to implement the effect of added 
mass due to icing for intact stability calculations and analyze the effects on ship stability 
with example ship models. 
 
Main objective of these tools is to be accurate and efficient to identify and represent the 
conditions to be studied. The secondary objective is to make these tools to be as universal 
as possible so that they are efficient to use with all shaped ships. With these tools, it is 
possible to study how Polar Code’s stability requirements affects the design of new 
vessels and how the requirements have effect on existing ships that are originally intended 
or converted for operations in polar waters, but not designed directly as per Polar Code. 
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The purpose of developed tools is naturally also provide more efficient way for stability 
calculations in respect of time and reliability. 
 
One part of the study is to determine appropriate ship(s) to carry out the case studies. For 
damage stability example calculations it is important to acquire a realistic ship model that 
is designed to fulfill relevant rules, so that the results can be seen to reflect realistic 
scenarios. For intact stability case studies less realistic ship models are adequate, as only 
hull form and loading conditions have influence on results. What is also important is to 
consider how in general the Polar Code affects those existing ships that area already 
operating in polar areas or will be converted for polar operations. One aim of stability 
tools development is that they should work with conventional hull forms. 
 
The analysis part of the thesis will study how the damage scenarios and icing affects the 
stability of selected example ships. Major part of the thesis is to develop and offer an 
efficient way for damage generation and filtering and also for the ice accumulation on the 
ship’s external structures.  
 
This thesis is not aimed to provide optimum design solutions or practices for arctic ship 
design. Also the parts of Polar Code that are not focused to ship stability are considered 
only on general level to provide more complete understanding of the Polar Code as whole. 
Also both, intact and damage stability, tools to be offered are developed and studied with 
conventional hull and superstructure forms, and the cases of more complex or special 
ships are not covered in order to keep the focus of the study limited. The aim of the 
developed tools is not to do everything ready for the designer but to help to create the 
required intact and damage stability scenarios, reducing the amount of manual work. 
 
The methods for carrying out the study are firstly literature review, to see what has been 
done in the past and what has been the driver in the development of the rules and 
regulation regarding the ship stability and operations in the ice covered seas. Second 
method in the thesis is to experimentally study ship stability as stated in the Polar Code 
for intact and damage conditions. The experimental part is carried out by NAPA software, 
which currently does not have ready built support or tools for these purposes of 
accounting icing and finding relevant damage cases as Polar Code defines them. Thus 
one important step in the experimental study is to develop tools to account the icing and 
filtering out the relevant damage cases that fulfill the Polar Code damage extents. The 
tool for icing uses the 3D ship model to obtain deck areas and lateral projection of the 
ship to determine the amount of ice accumulation, to be then used as a mass load in desired 
loading condition. The damage stability related tool is aimed to use several filters to find 
all relevant cases out of all damage scenarios that NAPA can automatically create, based 
on ships subdivision. These tools must be developed first in order to obtain the results 
how the stability rules affect ship stability. 
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2 Review of the Polar code 
 
The four main factors and guidelines affecting polar-ship design and operations are: 
SOLAS, MARPOL, classification societies and the governmental ice rules. 
Governmental rules may concern more special aspects of ship design, such as winter 
navigation. These set the limits in which the ship designers can use their own expertise 
and vision for the ship design. The national and international rules for ship design and 
building exist to ensure the safety of shipping and setting all flag states to same line on 
safety standards. 
 
The governmental rules for winter navigation mean that in some special sea areas local 
officials have set their own design principles for the design and construction of ice going 
ships. These rules usually define the ice class of the vessel and the aim of the local rules 
is to encourage ship owners to have safer and more capable ships in these special areas 
so that accidents would not happen and ships could navigate more independently. For 
example at northern Baltic Sea area, ship with a higher ice class will have lower fairway 
dues and better access for icebreaker assistance when needed according to FSICR 
(Finnish-Swedish ice class rules) (Kujala & Riska 2010) (Trafi 2010a).  
 
However, as the polar waters are in some areas international waters or icebreaker 
assistance is not available, the aim of the Polar Code is to guide the ship design and 
operations so that all vessels navigating in these areas are capable to withstand and 
survive independently in rough sea and weather conditions for which the ship is designed. 
The aim of the Polar Code can be divided firstly to accident prevention by ship design 
and risk assessment, and secondly to ensure ship and crew safety in case of accident. 
Third goal of the Polar Code is protection of arctic environment. In the scope of ship 
stability, these aspects are represented in the Polar Code by rules concerning ship’s intact 
and damage stability. 
 
The Polar Code regulations are additional safety precautions for ships operating in polar 
waters that are considered as an addition for the existing regulations. In other words, all 
the previous and existing regulations need to be taken into account as in the past, and by 
those parts where Polar Code sets higher safety and design requirements, the Polar Code 
is applied. 
 
2.1
 Effects on new ships 
 
Polar Code sets five new safety measures in part I-A which is mandatory for the new-
builds that are started on or after 01.01.2017. Naturally, new-builds must be in accordance 
with other requirements in Polar Code also. These new-build specific requirements are 
focused on the special environment where safety of people and function of equipment 
need to be taken account differently, compared to ships sailing in warmer sea areas and 
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closer to infrastructure. These requirements concerning only new-builds are (IMO 
2015a): 
 
1. The damage stability requirement as in PC section 4.3.2. 
2. For ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017, exposed escape routes 
shall be arranged so as not to hinder passage by persons wearing suitable 
polar clothing, as stated in PC 8.3.1.2 section. 
3. Ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017, ice strengthened in 
accordance with chapter 3, shall have either two independent echo-
sounding devices or one echo-sounding device with two separate 
independent transducers, as stated in PC 9.3.2.1.1 section. 
4. In category A and B ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017, the 
bridge wings shall be enclosed or designed to protect navigational 
equipment and operating personnel, as stated in PC 9.3.2.1.4.2 section. 
 
 
In addition to this Polar Code gives also recommendations for these new-builds about 
pollution prevention in part II-A. Pollution prevention is also linked to the ship’s 
structural design and thus it can be in some cases difficult to convert old ships to 
correspond new regulations, however most of the regulations concerning structural design 
are mandatory for new-builds only. The pollution prevention requirements for new-builds 
are presented in six sections of Polar Code. These pollution prevention requirements are 
(IMO 2015a): 
 
 
5. For category A and B ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017 with 
an aggregate oil fuel capacity of less than 600 𝑚3, all oil fuel tanks shall 
be separated from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m. 
This provision does not apply to small oil fuel tanks with a maximum 
individual capacity not greater than 30 𝑚3. 
6. For category A and B ships other than oil tankers constructed on or after 
1 January 2017, all cargo tanks constructed and utilized to carry oil shall 
be separated from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m. 
7. For category A and B oil tankers of less than 5,000 tonnes deadweight 
constructed on or after 1 January 2017, the entire cargo tank length shall 
be protected with: 
a. double bottom tanks or spaces complying with the applicable 
requirements of regulation 19.6.1 of MARPOL Annex I; and  
b. wing tanks or spaces arranged in accordance with regulation 
19.3.1 of MARPOL Annex I and complying with the applicable 
requirements for distance referred to in regulation 19.6.2 of 
MARPOL Annex I. 
8. For category A and B ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017 all 
oil residue (sludge) tanks and oily bilge water holding tanks shall be 
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separated from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m. This 
provision does not apply to small tanks with a maximum individual 
capacity not greater than 30 𝑚3. 
9. For category A and B ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017, the 
carriage of NLS identified in chapter 17, column e, as ship type 3 or 
identified as NLS in chapter 18 of the International Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals 
in Bulk in cargo tanks of type 3 ships shall be subject to the approval of 
the Administration. The results shall be reflected on the International 
Pollution Prevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid 
Substances in Bulk or Certificate of Fitness identifying the operation in 
polar waters. 
10. Discharge of sewage into the sea is prohibited from category A and B 
ships constructed on or after 1 January 2017 and all passenger ships 
constructed on or after 1 January 2017, except when such discharges are 
in compliance with paragraph 4.2.1.3 of this chapter. 
 
 
If a new ship is not designed according to Polar Code, but later in the future it is re-routed 
to operate in the polar waters, it needs to fulfill the Polar Code criteria to obtain the polar 
ship certificate. In this case, damage stability requirement may pose a difficult challenge. 
Especially for passenger vessels, offshore supply vessels and bulk carriers this can lead 
to a re-design and modification of subdivision after SOLAS requirements has been 
followed in the original design, according to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS 2016). 
This is because SOLAS requires the probabilistic damage stability approach, which 
leaves possibility for damage that will sink the ship under damage scenario described in 
Polar Code. According to ABS (2016) tankers are the only ship type that already is 
required to fulfill two-compartment damage requirements with even larger transverse 
extent as defined in Polar Code. 
 
2.2
 Effects on existing ships 
 
Polar Code affects also existing ships that are already operating, or will be converted for 
polar water operations. In practice, this means that ship owner needs to prove that all 
requirements mentioned in Polar Code are fulfilled, apart from those that are specified to 
concern only the new-builds. The hull structure is one of the key factors affecting directly 
into which category the ship will be included by the Polar Code. For stability point-of-
view, the effect of ice accumulation on intact stability needs to be studied for existing 
ships. However the damage stability requirement concerns only new-builds. The Polar 
Code mandatory rules apply to all existing ships, apart from the 10 requirements for new-
builds only, mentioned in the earlier chapter 2.1. 
 
The most remarkable effect for existing ships is that they need to prove their polar 
worthiness, which means that the ship needs to have adequate ice class depending on its 
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planned operational area. In addition requirements on watertight and weather tight 
integrity, machinery installations, fire safety/protection, life-saving appliances and 
arrangements, safety of navigation, communication and voyage planning needs to be 
taken into account. These aspects are taken into account by considering the possible 
effects of coldness, wind, rain and remoteness.  
 
One of the most severe effects is icing which may prevent the use of doors and hatches, 
navigational and communication devices. Also the geographical position set requirements 
for navigational equipment because of declination and uncharted seabed. For these 
reasons sufficient sounding devices and navigational equipment is needed. (IMO 2015a) 
In addition, navigational GPS devices have been detected to have some problems in high 
latitudes related to weak vertical signal of GPS since there is no satellites directly above 
and some issues in GPS log-files when transiting over the International Date Line making 
the location data incorrect (Salokannel 2013) (ABS 2016). Icing is also a concern for ship 
stability as it accumulates on ship increasing the displacement and center of gravity. 
 
 
2.3
 Differences between category A, B and C ships 
 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, Polar Code divides ships into three categories. The 
purpose of the categories is to set thresholds for operational areas acceptable for ships 
depending on their capability to survive in different ice conditions in remote areas. The 
main parameter for defining into which Polar Code -category an existing ship should be 
included, is the IACS Polar Class structural requirements. If ship is built according to 
some other ice class requirements, then a comparison carried out to determine which 
IACS polar class resembles it closest.  
 
The comparison is especially important when ship’s ice class is low, when possible Polar 
Code categories for such vessel are respectively B or C. To ease this comparison, Trafi 
(2010b) has prepared a table to compare other ice class rules to FSICR. Based on Trafi’s 
data, Table 1 is gathered to compare different ice classes in respect IACS ice classes PC 
6 and PC 7. The operational areas are defined according to current weather and sea 
conditions, and the operational area charts in Figure 5 and Figure 6 as mentioned earlier, 
are only for illustrative purposes. The final responsibility of evaluating the current sea 
and ice conditions, and whether or not those conditions area inside the limits described in 
the ships Polar Class Certificate, is in the hands of the master of the ship (IMO 2015a). 
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Table 1. Equivalent ice classes for PC 6 and PC 7, comparable Polar Code category B (Trafi 2010b). 
Classification society or 
Authority 
PC 6 corresponding ice 
class 
PC 7 corresponding ice 
class 
ABS Ice Class I AA Ice Class I A 
BV Ice Class IA Super Ice Class IA 
CCS Ice class B1* Ice class B1 
DNV ICE-1A* ICE-1A 
FSICR IA Super IA 
GL E4 E3 
KRS IA Super IA 
LR 100 A1 Ice Class 1AS FS 100 A1 Ice Class 1A FS 
NKK  NS (Class IA Super Ice 
Strengthening) 
NS (Class IA Ice 
Strengthening) 
PRS L1A L1 
RINA ICE CLASS IA SUPER ICE CLASS IA 
RMRS Arc 5 – Arc 7 Arc 4 
 
Division to categories A and B is straight forward when ship is built directly according 
to IACS Polar Class rules. Polar classes PC 1-5 are included in category A, and classes 
PC-6 and PC-7 are included to category B. (IMO 2015a) Requirements for category C 
ships have more room for interpretation, depending on expected ice condition in designed 
operational area. Approval of hull structures for category C ships is thus relying more on 
co-operation with relevant administration since these cases have more individual and 
distinctive nature in respect to operational conditions. 
 
Biggest difference in operational area and requirement perspective is between category C 
and category B ships. Category C ships are allowed to sail only in such sea conditions 
where no ice is present or ice condition are less severe than for category A and B ships, 
and thus the damage stability requirement is not mandatory as ice conditions are 
nonexistent or easy. In addition for category C ships ice strengthening is not directly 
mandatory, when according to the Administration’s opinion the current structure of the 
hull is adequate for the ships purpose and operational area. (IMO 2015a)  
 
It is expected that many of the passenger vessels designed for cruises in polar waters will 
be designed into category C (Ihalainen 2017). The damage stability requirement would 
not then be mandatory for passenger ships in category C, even though, according to 
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American Bureau of Shipping (ABS 2016) there had been concerns in the Polar Code 
development group about the safety of category C vessels in case of ice related damage. 
2.4
 Background to stability requirements 
 
2.4.1 Intact stability 
 
In areas where temperature can go below freezing point, ice can start to form on ship’s 
external structures. In the past. In the Polar Code, this is taken into consideration by taking 
account icing on vertical and lateral structures. Same stability requirements are also 
introduced earlier in the IMO IS 2008 -code (IMO 2008) where these optional 
requirements are intended for those ships expected to operate in areas where icing is likely 
to occur. Ice accretion requirements have been also introduced already in 1993 in fishing 
vessel guidelines (Torremolinos Protocol 1993). 
 
All ships that are intended to have the Polar Ship Certificate (Polar Code), are required 
be designed according to the intact stability requirements of the Polar Code. The rule for 
intact stability concerns all vessels, new and existing, that are intended to have polar ship 
certificate and if the ship is subjected to ice accretion in its planned operations. The intact 
stability rule states (IMO 2015a): 
 
1.  30 𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 on exposed weather decks and gangways; 
2.  7.5 𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 for the projected lateral area of each side of the ship above the water 
plane; and  
3.  the projected lateral area of discontinuous surfaces of rail, sundry booms, spars 
(except masts) and rigging of ships having no sails and the projected lateral area 
of other small objects shall be computed by increasing the total projected area of 
continuous surfaces by 5% and the static moments of this area by 10%. 
 
The above-mentioned icing allowance has to be taken into account in the stability 
calculations that are relevant for the ship. The icing affects ship stability by increasing 
the center of gravity and thus making the ship more unstable by decreasing the GM value 
and increasing rolling moment (ABS 2016). To ease the designing of vessels and intact 
stability calculation, a tool is developed in this study to calculate the effect of ice 
accumulation on ship’s external structures. The main idea of the tool is to calculate ship’s 
external lateral and exposed deck areas where ice can accumulate.  
 
It is worth highlighting that the icing allowance is not needed to be taken into account if 
the ship is not subjected to ice accretion. The assessment whether or not the icing 
allowance is relevant for specific ship is not clarified in the Polar Code. The possibility 
of the relevance of icing is considered in the Operation Assessment part of the Polar Code. 
Ship’s intended operational area and seasonal variation in weather condition are two 
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important factors in this assessment (Lloyd's Register 2016). The chart of areas of having 
high possibility for icing in Figure 7, gives some advice on the matter, but does not 
differentiate seasonal changes in the areas. 
 
 
Figure 7. Chart of areas of icing conditions (IMO 2008) 
 
The weather conditions for icing are most severe when temperature is below freezing 
point and high winds and waves are present, combined with rain in liquid or snow form. 
Ice accretion can be originate from two sources of water; from seawater-spray icing or 
atmospheric icing. Especially such sea conditions where wavelength and amplitude that 
makes the ship bow ram into the next wave causes water to spray in the air. In a study by 
Borisenkov and Panov (1972), it was observed from around 3000 cases of icing on ships, 
that the seawater spray is the main source of icing with 89% portion of all icing causes. 
In the arctic seas, approximately 50% of icing cases has been caused only from seawater 
spray and 41% of cases are a combination of seawater spray and atmospheric icing 
(Makkonen 1984). According to Makkonen’s (1984) study much smaller portion of icing 
cases are caused by only atmospheric icing, where 6% is due to rain and 3% because of 
fog alone.  
 
Ice accumulation can be expected to occur up to the height of 15 m from the sea level, 
after which seawater spray is insignificant source of icing (Minsk 1977). In seawater 
spray icing, wind is naturally an important factor, conveying the water in the air over the 
ship. For structures above the 15-meter limit, atmospheric icing becomes more likely 
source of icing and therefore these higher parts of superstructure are reasonable to be 
taken into account in intact stability calculations. However, in favorable conditions it has 
been recorded seawater spray related icing to occur at heights of 30 meter over the water 
 20 
 
line on fast passenger ship, GTS Finnjet, where high speed was noticed to be one factor 
resulting spray icing to reach higher decks (Makkonen 1984). 
 
 
The icing allowances set in the Polar Code give design values for the ice accumulation 
per deck area. It is a simple approach to calculate the total mass and center of gravity for 
the accumulated ice masses. The icing allowances of 30 𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 for horizontal areas and 
7.5 𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 for lateral projection results ice layer thickness of 3.28 cm for deck areas and 
0.82 cm for lateral projection, using value 915 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 for ice density. These values are 
in a range of icing values that can be expected after ship has been around one to three 
hours in a polar low situation, which is a weather phenomenon in the Norwegian and 
Barents seas that involve high winds, waves and raining or snowfalls, due to fast-moving 
cold air front (Orimolade et al. 2016). In the study by Orimolande et al. (2016) three 
different icing rates of 1.47, 0.45, and 2.05 cm/h were obtained from three separate polar 
low situation in the Barents Sea, reviling that especially low temperature is key factor for 
rapid ice accretion.  
 
One extreme icing event that has been recorded took place on February 1987 for a 105 
meter-long Norwegian coast guard vessel KV Nordkapp, sailing from Tromsø towards 
Svalbard in the border of Norwegian and Barents seas. In this icing case, approximately 
Figure 8. Icing on ship (Wikimedia/Robert A. Pawlowski) 
 21 
 
20 cm thick layer of ice was measured on the fore part of the main deck after 17 hours of 
polar low weather, resulting total of 110 tons of ice (Samuelsen et al. 2015). The 
temperature in this case varied between −10℃ to −20℃, winds blowing at 20-30 𝑚/𝑠 
and waves reaching 7.5 meters high. Despite the extreme icing, KV Nordkapp remained 
its stability. This extremely high ice accretion value is also used in some cases as a design 
value for ice going ships. Use of higher ice accretion values have support from Hovilainen 
and Vocke (2017) who state that approximately 10 times higher ice accretion values, 
compared to ones in the Polar Code, have been used in the past when designing certain 
ice-going vessels due to classification society requirement. These ice accretion values 
would mean ice thickness to be in range of 30 cm for deck areas and around 8 cm for 
lateral areas. 
 
Wires and cables are especially prone for icing, for which reason Polar Code guides to 
design ships in a way to minimize icing. In 1920 observations from Soviet Union, 
recorded icing of 11.4 cm in diameter was accumulated on a 5 mm thick wire (Minsk 
1980). Another high icing incident recorded occurred in Canada, Newfoundland, where 
25 cm diameter icing was measured on the guy-wires of radio tower (Boyd and Williams 
1968). 
 
Icing is a serious threat for ships navigating in polar waters. Weather forecasts for icing 
are part of the information that different meteorological organizations offer for seafarers. 
Icing is especially threat for smaller vessels such as fishing vessels since the icing has 
relatively larger effect on their stability because of lower freeboard and more surfaces 
like masts and wires for ice to accrete, in comparison to vessel size (Kobylinski 2015). 
Icing occurs relatively often at polar waters as there has been over 1200 recorded icing 
events between 1970-2005 in the eastern coast of Canada (Timco & Kubat 2005). The 
icing incident reports until 1985 know 26 cases when ship sank due to icing, out of about 
300 recorded cases of icing incidents, so at least in the past icing has caused many 
accidents (Kobylinski 2015). Especially smaller ships such as trawlers and coast guard 
vessels are found to be most vulnerable for icing (Kobylinski 2015) (Kozo 1986). 
 
2.4.2 Damage stability 
 
Damage stability regulation in Polar Code consists about deterministic damage scenario. 
It is described with a ‘damage-box’ with certain extents depending of the ships 
dimensions. The purpose of the damage scenario in the Polar Code is to take into account 
special cases of ice related damages that is unique for polar waters. The ice related 
damages occur mostly due to hard multiyear ice (Kubat & Timco 2003). 
 
In the study by Kubat and Timco, analyzing the damage data of 125 ice-related damage 
events in Canadian arctic, 73% of the cases were caused by multiyear ice. In three of these 
occasions the ship was sank. The data also shows that first year ice did not cause any loss 
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of ship. In 19 cases of multiyear ice damage data, the ice has caused a large and significant 
hole to the hull but not total loss of vessel. The ice damage data in Kubat’s and Timco’s 
study (2003) has been gathered from accident reports between the years 1978-2003. 
Figure 9 shows the locations where these ice related damages have occurred according to 
a five-year earlier study by Timco & Morin (1998). The study reveals that approximately 
12% of all over 1000 voyages recorded in the Canadian arctic are associated with a 
damage event, varying from shell plate and frame buckling until total loss of ship. 
However, some precaution is needed when reading the Figure 9 since it is strange that no 
damage cases have been recorded in the Northern Sea Route. The green ‘no damage’ 
legend in the map stands for safe transit trough ice infested sea area, and the red legends 
mark the location where ice related damage has taken place. 
 
 
Figure 9. Location of ice related damages in Canadian arctic (Timco & Morin 1998). 
 
The damage stability rules in Polar Code start with a statement about which ships the rule 
concerns, which are the new-build ships of categories A and B, but mentions also 
exception. It states for new-build cargo ships as follows (IMO 2015a): 
 
However, for cargo ships that comply with subdivision and damage stability regulations 
in another instrument developed by the Organization, as provided by SOLAS regulation 
II-1/4.1, the residual stability criteria of that instrument shall be met for each loading 
condition. 
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This means that in some cases regulation may be stricter for example tankers and gas 
carriers and these cases also those regulation need to be considered. 
 
The criteria for damage stability in Polar Code is set by using the survivability factor as 
used in SOLAS 2009 stability calculation for attained index determination. Polar Code 
requires that in every relevant damage scenario that the factor s=1. The intermediate 
stages of flooding are not taken into account in the calculation. Calculation of the factor 
s is presented by it parameters in equation below. 
 
𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝐾 ∗ [
𝐺𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥
0.12
∗
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
16
]
1/4
 
 
Where 𝐺𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum positive righting lever, in meters, up to the angle 𝜃𝑣, 
Range is the range of positive righting levers, in degrees, measured from the angle 𝜃𝑒 . 
The positive range is to be taken up to the angle 𝜃𝑣, 𝜃𝑣 is the angle, in any stage of 
flooding, where the righting lever becomes negative, or the angle at which an opening 
incapable of being closed weathertight becomes submerged  and K is obtained as, 
 
 
In Polar Code’s damage stability regulation, the damage length and height dimensions 
are in relation to ship’s dimensions. It means that ice can cause larger size damages on 
larger vessels. The worst situation is that the ship will collide to a very large piece or flow 
of multi-year ice. In this kind of situation, the ice will not move very much and it will 
make the ship stop. Assuming the ship structures and ice-class are similar with larger and 
smaller vessel, the difference with larger vessel is that it has more mass and hence more 
kinetic energy for the ice floe to work against and stop the ship. This means that the ice 
or ship structures need to absorb the energy, and in the worst case, it is the ship structures 
deforming more as the ship size grows. 
 
The assumed reason why Polar Code defines the damage extents as a percentage of vessel 
dimensions is assumed here to be the kinetic energy explanation, since no confirmed 
explanation was to be found after querying from several experts of the field. The Polar 
Code states the damage dimensions and damage locations to be studied as below (IMO 
2015a): 
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1. The longitudinal extent is 4.5% of the upper ice waterline length if 
centred forward of the maximum breadth on the upper ice waterline, 
and 1.5% of upper ice waterline length otherwise, and shall be 
assumed at any longitudinal position along the ship's length;  
 
2. The transverse penetration extent is 760 mm, measured normal to the 
shell over the full extent of the damage; and  
 
3. The vertical extent is the lesser of 20% of the upper ice waterline 
draught or the longitudinal extent, and shall be assumed at any vertical 
position between the keel and 120% of the upper ice waterline draught. 
 
The rule statements are short and easy to understand, but there lies few issues related 
interpretation. Firstly, in which direction vertical extent is measured in the bottom area of 
hull? Another interpretation issue concerns the longitudinal extent at bow and aft areas 
where hull has curvature. Is the longitudinal extent measured directly in respect to the X-
axis from hull’s shell plating, or is it measured from the inner parts of the damage-box, 
taking account the curvature and damage penetration in respect to the normal of the hull?  
 
Since the section 1 in the rule discusses about the waterline length, it would be possible 
to understand that the damage length is applied also to the hull as looking directly the 
projection curve of the waterline in XZ -plane, as is the waterline length also measured. 
On other point of view, section 2 states that the transverse penetration must be measured 
to the normal direction of the hull. This indicates that damage length and vertical height, 
must be applied so that those extents are measured along the hull surface that may have 
curvature. The two possible interpretations are illustrated in below 
Figure 10 and Figure 11. In the figures, UIWL stands for upper ice waterline length. 
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Coordinate system used in the whole study is right-handed, where Z-axis get higher 
positive values when moving from keel line to the direction of main deck. Location of the 
origin is set to be at the intersection of the keel line and the aft perpendicular. 
 
 
Figure 10. Damage length interpretation option ‘A’. 
 
The damage length interpretation, named in this context as ‘A’, in 
Figure 10 accounts the damage length as from the most extreme X-coordinated of the 
‘damage-box’ at 0.76 m penetration. Because of hull curvature in the fore part of the ship, 
the most farthest x-coordinate of the ‘damage-box’ is found at the ‘damage-boxes’ corner 
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that is 0.76 meters inside the hull. Same principle applies also to aft ship area where 
longitudinal length is 1.5% of UIWL. 
 
 
Figure 11. Damage length interpretation option ‘B’. 
 
The damage length interpretation, named in this context as ‘B’, in Figure 11 accounts the 
damage length as measured directly along the X-axis. In another words, the damage 
length is interpreted as a projected length and extended directly towards Y-axis, 
perpendicular to X-axis. This results that the ‘damage-box’ receives some amount of extra 
volume compared to option ‘A’, as the damage penetration is limited to the offset surface 
of the original ship hull, that is 0.76 meters inwards from ship hull directly towards 
centerline. 
 
In both cases ‘A’ and ‘B’ the damage extent in x-axis direction is naturally same. What 
is different is the interpretation where the damage length is measured. The interpretation 
has effect to the shape of the ‘damage-box’, as in option ‘B’ the ends of the damage are 
parallel to y-axis and in option ‘A’ the ends of the damage are parallel to the normal of 
the hull. Because of these differences, the interpretation ‘B’ leads to slightly larger 
‘damage-box’ by volume, even though the longitudinal extent remains same. 
 
Currently there is not so much information about the interpretation of the Polar Code’s 
damage stability. In master thesis by Ihalainen (2017), it is suggested that the 
interpretation should be similar as described in the alternative ‘A’, at least for vertical 
extent. At the time of writing the Polar Code has been effective such a short time. For this 
reason not many ships have been gone through class approval process yet or any public 
documents or guidelines has not been published yet. The fact that the interpretation for 
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longitudinal extent is somewhat unclear, is that apparently any precedent case does not 
exist.  
 
As one of the goals of this study is to create a tool for determining the relevant damage 
cases according to Polar Code’s rules. The interpretation ‘B’ is selected for this study 
in order to keep the geometry of the ‘damage-box’ ambiguous and conservative from the 
safety aspect. This means also that damages vertical extent is measured directly in XY-
plane level from the hull surface, and not from the inner parts of the ‘damage-box’. The 
interpretation of vertical extent is illustrated in Figure 12 below.  
 
 
Figure 12. Ice damage's vertical extent with interpretation type 'B'. 
 
For damages in the flat-bottom area, the vertical extent is interpreted to account damage 
the extent in Y-axis direction. One reason for this is that in practice, all ships have a 
double bottom that is at least 0.76 meters in height (IMO 2014). Also otherwise the 
damage penetration and vertical extent would be measured in same Z-axis direction. 
These interpretations are used in the ice-damage tool development. The interpretation of 
vertical damage extent at bottom area is also supported by Ihalainen (2017). 
 
Damage stability analysis before the Polar Code was done for ships navigating in polar 
waters according to the probabilistic damage stability requirement as in SOLAS and other 
relevant requirements, such as OSV (offshore supply vessel) guidelines (IMO 2012) for 
offshore supply vessels. For passenger and cargo ships the probabilistic damage stability 
requirement was the only relevant requirement. By the nature of the probabilistic 
approach, some fatal damage cases are allowed to exist.  
 
Polar Code makes damage stability requirements stricter as the existing rules must be 
followed but also the Polar Code requirement must be followed stating no damage cases 
are allowed that can lead to loss of stability. However, the damage extents are different 
in Polar Code, so direct comparison is not possible between these approaches meaning it 
is not relevant to say Polar Code sets always higher safety standards.  
 
For passenger and cargo ships, the bottom area damages by Polar Code are also 
overlapping bottom damage scenarios defined in SOLAS. It (SOLAS) defines the damage 
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cases to be studied in some situations with even larger extents, using the same requirement 
as the Polar Code that no damage case should not sink the ship. Maybe the most 
significant difference in SOLAS bottom damage is the vertical extent. For very large ships 
having breadth over 40 meters, the SOLAS bottom damage rule requires extent of 2 
meters. However, for ships which breadth is less than 15.2 meters, Polar Code’s damage 
extent is higher in the bottom area compared to SOLAS bottom damage rule, as SOLAS 
defines penetration value of B/20. SOLAS bottom damage scenarios are located in the 
hull area under the double bottom at any longitudinal and transversal position, meaning 
the locations of damages are similar to Polar Code rule. 
 
The bottom damage extents by SOLAS are presented in below Table 2. SOLAS also states 
that if any smaller damage than specified by the maximum extents is more severe, such 
damage case needs to be considered. (IMO 2014) This comment about smaller and more 
severe damages is not included in the Polar Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Maximum bottom damage extents by SOLAS (IMO 2014). 
 For 0.3L from the forward 
perpendicular of the ship 
Any other part of the ship 
Longitudinal extent 1/3𝐿2/3 or 14.5 m, whichever 
is less 
1/3𝐿2/3 or 14.5 m, whichever 
is less 
Transverse extent B/6 or 10 m, whichever is 
less 
B/6 or 5 m, whichever is less 
Vertical extent, measured 
from the keel line 
B/20 or 2 m, whichever is 
less 
B/20 or 2 m, whichever is 
less 
 
Similar deterministic damage stability rule as in the Polar Code has been already 
introduced in offshore supply vessel guidelines (IMO 2012) where the transverse damage 
penetration is equal to Polar Code’s value, but the damage length and height are different. 
The exact damage dimensions from OSV guidelines state (IMO 2012): 
 
1.  longitudinal extent: 
1.1 for a vessel the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction* 
before 22 November 2012: with length (L) not greater than 43 m: 10% of L; and 
with length (L) greater than 43 m: 3 m plus 3% of L;  
 
1.2 for a vessel the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction 
on or after 22 November 2012: with length (L) not greater than 43 m: 10% of L; 
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with length (L) greater than 43 m and less than 80 m: 3 m plus 3% of L; and with 
length (L) from 80 m to 100 m: 1/3𝐿2/3; 
 
 
2.  transverse extent: 
2.1 for a vessel the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction 
before 22 November 2012: 760 mm measured inboard from the side of the vessel 
perpendicularly to the centerline at the level of the summer load waterline;  
 
2.2 for a vessel the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction 
on or after 22 November 2012: with length (L) less than 80 m: 760 mm; and with 
length (L) from 80 m to 100 m: B/20, but not less than 760 mm; The transverse 
extent should be measured inboard from the side of the vessel perpendicularly to 
the centreline at the level of the summer load waterline; and 
 
3. vertical extent:  
from the underside of the cargo deck, or the continuation thereof, for the full depth 
of the vessel. 
 
, where L means ship length between perpendiculars and B is the breath of the ship at 
extreme width from outside of frame to outside of frame at or below the deepest 
subdivision load line. 
 
The orientation of the damage penetration definition is different from the Polar Code, 
being orientated directly along the y-axis, as in the interpretation type ‘B’ described 
earlier. The damage length also differentiates from Polar Code in that sense that there is 
used only one length value. This can be understood in such way that the probability and 
severity of the damage is same at all longitudinal positions of the ship’s hull. The 
damage’s vertical extent is also assumed to be relatively much larger for OSVs, raging 
through the whole depth of the vessel. Even though the OSV guidelines state very similar 
damage case to be studied, according to the rulebook ice is not assumed to be the cause 
of the damage. The OSV guidelines (IMO 2012) is focused more on “near-costal 
voyages” and the rules are meant for ships ranging from 24 m to 100 m in length. These 
aspects are some possible factors that explain the differences in damage definition 
compared to Polar Code, as the distance to infrastructure and rescue is assumed to be 
close by. The OSV guidelines dates back to 1981 and are reviewed latest in 2012. (IMO 
2012) 
 
For new and existing tankers the damage stability regulations should not bring any 
changes, since double hull has been mandatory for tankers since 1983 (IMO 2015b), even 
though the damage stability requirement is not mandatory for existing ships. For 
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constructional reasons the double hull is always at least 0.76 m, and usually even more. 
So the damage cases that needs to be studied are practically already included in the 
probabilistic damage stability study. (Aker Arctic, 2017) 
 
The damage penetration value is fixed in Polar Code, compared to the other two extents. 
This means that same explanation about kinetic energy effecting the damage extents does 
not apply for the damage penetration. Even though no certain background was found the 
penetration value, according to Hovilainen and Vocke (2017), the value is conservative 
enough for penetration extent caused by collision with ice. As a number 0.76 meters 
relates translates 30 inch, or 2.5 feet, which gives some hint about the era and location 
when this value might be used originally in ship design. For example on year 1939 Finnish 
naval architect Mr. Jaakko Rahola (1939) was using already metric values in his early 
studies on ship stability, suggesting the 0.76 m value from British or North American 
person or organization. Another hint can be found from SOLAS 1960 treaty (IMCO 1960) 
which was still using imperial units as main units, but which were also translated metric 
units. The 1960 treaty states for example margin line to be 3 inches below the upper 
surface of bulkhead deck. In SOLAS 1976 treaty metric system is used solely for rule 
definitions. 
 
The conclusion for the use of damage penetration value of 0.76 meters is, that same value 
has been institutionalized prior to year 1974 to possibly describe some structural extent 
related to potential location of flooding, which is not mentioned directly in the treaties. 
The value has apparently found to be sufficient as it has been used for example in SOLAS 
2009 for minimum bottom damage penetration extent and minimum width for double hull 
in bulk carriers (IMO MSC.170(79)). In SOLAS 2009 treaty double bottom height is for 
the first time defined with mandatory minimum value, being 760 mm for vessels other 
than tanker (IMO 2009). 
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3 Intact stability calculation study 
 
3.1
 Sample ships 
 
One goal of the study is to develop a method for calculating the effect of icing on intact 
ship stability. This means a tool that can determine the amount of ice accretion based on 
the 3D ship model and then implement the effect to ship stability calculations. In order to 
make reliable stability calculations with the developed tool, the ship models used in the 
tool development should be as realistic as possible and fulfill the structural requirements 
as required for any SOLAS 2009 ship, especially for the damage stability calculations. 
The most essential parts of the ship model used for intact stability tool development are 
the superstructure and the hull form, which have direct effect on ship stability and the ice 
accretion. Three ship models are selected for the example calculations and one test-case 
ship is created for the tool verification purposes.  
 
One of the sample ships represent realistic passenger ship passenger vessel and other two 
are relatively realistic bulk carrier and naval frigate. All sample ships are utilized already 
in the tool development phase to ensure the final outcome to be as compatible with several 
ships as possible. 
 
The verification of the tool’s functionality is tested on a very simple shaped ship model, 
created solely for that purpose of the tool verification. The test-case ship has only 
 32 
 
rectangle-shaped decks to allow easily verify the functionality of the tool, meaning that 
the areas and center of gravity locations are simple to calculate manually and see possible 
differences compared to results obtained from the developed tool.  
 
The test-case ship called POLARTEST is illustrated below in Figure 13. The functionality 
of the icing tool is verified with this test-case ship to ensure the tool works as intended. 
 
 
Figure 13. Test-case ship model, POLARTEST, used in the tool verification. 
 
A 240 m long cruise ship, FLOODSTAND-B ship, is selected to be the primary ship 
model used in the case studies. The FLOODSTAND-B ship is designed by Meyer Werft 
GmbH shipyard and it is fulfilling relevant SOLAS 2009 requirements for the ship type 
in question, as its building was imaginarily planned to start in July 2010 (Luhmann 2009). 
It has been used also earlier as a test case ship in other studies where the 3D NAPA model 
was finalized. However, as the FLOODSTAND-B design has not gone through 
classification society’s approval, it cannot be considered completely realistic ship design, 
but is still sufficient and good for the purposes in this study, as it has been good case study 
ship in the original FLOODSTAND project (Jalonen et al 2012) (Luhmann 2009). 
 
This particular ship, model and often passenger ships in general, do not have double sides. 
The ship has decks high up from sea level where icing has larger effect for the stability. 
Cruise ship model offers thus interesting platform for both intact and damage stability 
study. This size cruise ship is also in the same magnitude of cruise vessels that are likely 
to be used in polar areas for tourist cruises. Larger cruise ships are not yet seen as possible 
candidate for polar waters because of deeper draught and because of the industry of Arctic 
and Antarctic expedition cruises is still being relatively young and the customer base is 
not as wide as in traditional cruises (Ihalainen 2017). The studied cruise ship demonstrates 
 33 
 
how conventional cruise ship design behaves under the altered loading condition due to 
icing, taken into account as described in the Polar Code. The main particulars of the cruise 
ship are shown in Table 3 below. The table includes information about the location of 
freeboard, which is the highest limits of buoyant hull. It is important limit for interpreting 
the later results, as it has direct effect on the immersion angle of freeboard. Openings are 
not used in the example calculations since all studied ship models do not include those 
and would thus make the comparison of results more complex. Profile view of the 
FLOODSTAND-B is presented below in the Figure 14 and general overview of its 3D 
model in Figure 15. 
 
Table 3. Main dimensions of studied passenger ship FLOODSTAND-B. (Luhmann 2009) 
LOA 238,00 m 
Length pp 216,80 m 
Beam moulded 32,20 m 
Freeboard/bulkhead deck location 9,80 m 
Draught design (approx.) 7,20 m 
Draught max (approx.) 7,40 m 
Tonnage (approx.) 63000 GT 
Number of passengers + crew 1800 + 600 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. FLOODSTAND-B profile view (Luhmann 2009) 
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Figure 15. Passenger ship FLOODSTAND-B 3D-model (Luhmann 2009). 
 
 
The other two sample ships used for intact stability case studies are so-called “demo 
projects” included in the NAPA software. The bulker and naval frigate are not designed 
as intended to be an actual ship to be built, but they still represent the appropriate ship 
types well enough for the proposes of this study. Both of the vessels have typical hull 
form of the ship type with adequate superstructure and loading conditions. The loading 
conditions are the main source for possible inaccuracy, as the ships models have not gone 
through classification process and thus the structures and compartments may be 
unrealistic on some level. However both ship designs provide good reference for the icing 
study as the superstructures are adequate and give good reference how much ice will 
accumulate. Main dimensions and other relevant information of the ships are presented 
in Table 4 below. General arrangements of the bulker and frigate are shown in Figure 16 
and Figure 17, and the 3D models of the ships used in calculation are presented in Figure 
18 and Figure 19. 
 
Table 4. Main dimension of used bulk carrier and naval frigate. 
 Bulker Frigate 
LOA [m] 224.0 148.2 
B [m] 36.0 15.9 
T [m] 15.0 4.9 
Freeboard/bulkhead deck 
location [m] 
Z=21 Z=9.4 
Displacement [tons] 101600 5400 
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Figure 16. General arrangement of studied bulk carrier (NAPA 2017). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. General arrangement of studied naval frigate (NAPA 2017). 
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Figure 18. Bulk carrier, NAPA D-Bulker 3D-model. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Naval frigate, NAPA D-Frigate 3D-model. 
 
3.2
 Intact stability tool development 
 
Currently there is no ready-built tool for taking into account the icing related change of 
loading condition, which affects the ship stability. Implementing and developing a new 
intact stability tool for the NAPA software is based on the use of a 3D ship model and 
loading conditions of the ship. The resulted ice mass, which is calculated based on the 3D 
model, is added to relevant loading conditions for the intact stability calculations. 
 
In some cases the calculation of added mass from icing can be very time-consuming if 
carried out completely manually. Also the risk of human errors will exist. These problems 
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arise especially if the ship superstructure is complex-shaped which leads to high number 
of surfaces that needs to be taken account separately.  
 
The determination of added mass due to ice has two main steps. First, calculation of the 
area and centroid (noted as CoG as the ice mass is added to these points) of each deck 
and the lateral projection. Second main step is that the ice load is added on these areas 
and the combined center of gravity of the decks and lateral projection is calculated to 
represent the added mass at single coordinate. Below equation is used for calculating the 
centroid (noted as CoG) of decks, using the sections above and below the deck (same 
equation applies for all X, Y and Z coordinates of CoG): 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑑 = ((𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴1 ∗ 𝐴𝐷1) − (𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴2 ∗ 𝐴𝐷2))/𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐴𝐷1 − 𝐴𝐷2) 
 
where; 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑑 is the center of gravity of exposed deck, 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴1 is center of gravity 
coordinate for lower section below deck, 𝐴𝐷1 is area for lower section below deck, 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴2 is center of gravity coordinate for upper section above deck and 𝐴𝐷2 is area for 
upper section above deck. The tool fetches the values 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴1 and 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝐷𝐴2 automatically 
from the geometry of the sections above and below the deck. 
 
In case the denominator in above equation gets value 0 from the reduction of areas, the 
result is considered directly by finding the average of the coordinates of the upper and 
lower sections. Equation for decks’ and lateral projection’s combined ice mass 
coordinates, same equation applies for X, Y and Z coordinates is presented below: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑛 = (𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛 ∗ 𝑚𝑙 + 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛 ∗ 𝑚𝑑)/(𝑚𝑙 + 𝑚𝑑) 
 
where; 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑛 is the coordinate value of lateral projection’s and decks combined center 
of gravity, 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛 is coordinate n for lateral projection, 𝑚𝑙  is ice mass on the lateral 
projection, 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑛 is coordinate n for deck area and 𝑚𝑑 is the ice mass on deck. 
 
The projected lateral area of the superstructure is obtained by creating a union curve from 
Y-sections taken across ship breath, to describe the lateral projection. The curve can be 
made with a built-in feature in the software used. Using directly a calculation section at 
coordinate Y=0 of the ship is not a good approach for making the profile curve since the 
superstructure can be unsymmetrical in some ships. This would cause the profile curve to 
describe only the center line and not the actual side projection. 
 
The aim of the developed tool is to automatically determine the vertical and lateral areas 
of the superstructure from the 3D model using very little manual input from the user. The 
required inputs are the Z-coordinates of each exposed deck, or other horizontal flat area, 
in the superstructure. In addition the offset value for sections below and above the decks 
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can be given. For the stability calculation the user needs to define in which loading 
conditions he or she wishes to add the mass, these loading conditions can be for example 
heaviest and lightest loading condition. User inputs needed for intact stability tool is 
described in Table 5. User inputs for the developed intact stability tool. below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. User inputs for the developed intact stability tool. 
Input Explanation of input 
Z-coordiantes of exposed decks Used to indentify the decks in exposed 
superstucture 
Offset value Used for generating sections below and 
above decks 
Trim (opt.) Optional, if no loading condition exists 
Draught (opt.) Optional, if no loading condition exists 
Loading condition(s) Direct way to determine floating position 
for stability calculation 
 
The process of the intact stability tool is explained below with short step-by-step 
description. 
 
1. User inputs: locations of superstructure decks, loading conditions to 
study, (opt.) offset for deck comparison (by default 0.1 m), (opt.) trim, 
(opt.) draught 
2. With deck locations, sections above and below each decks is created 
using the offset value 
3. The offset deck sections are reduced from each other, resulting the 
exposed deck area. The area representing exposed deck area is located 
Z-coordinate as original user input for that deck 
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4. Centroid (CoG) of exposed decks is calculated with built-in 
functionality 
5. Ice mass 30 kg/m2 is multiplied with decks’ areas 
6. Exposed decks mass and CoG is combined 
7. Lateral projection curve of the ship above waterline is created 
8. The additional 5% area is calculated for lateral projection 
9. Ice mass 7.5 kg/m2 is added to the projected area 
10. Ice mass of 7.5 kg/m2 with additional 10% increase is added to the 5% 
addition of lateral area 
11. Combined mass and CoG of decks and lateral projection with the extra 
allowance, is combined to a single point 
12. The resulting mass and its CoG is added to relevant loading conditions 
13. Intact stability criteria are calculated for these loading conditions with 
relevant criteria 
 
The verification of the tool is one part of the intact stability tool development. The 
verification is carried out with the test-case ship POLARTEST, which has simple shaped 
decks and superstructure for allowing simple manual calculation of areas. 
 
Based on the geometry of the test-case ship POLARTEST, areas of lateral projection and 
decks are calculated manually. As a result, total ice mass of 74552.25 kg or about 74.55 
tons is obtained. The combined center of gravity for the ice masses on decks and lateral 
areas is calculated to be at X=50.89, Y=0, Z=12.02.  
 
The developed tool would then add this mass to the relevant loading conditions as a mass 
load at the obtained coordinate for stability calculations. After that intact stability could 
be calculated with relevant criteria, taking into account the effects ice accretion. Any 
intact stability criteria is not applied for this test-case ship, since it does not represent 
realistic ship design and thus would not give reliable insight for the stability aspect. 
 
These ice mass and CoG results verify the correct functionality of the intact stability 
tool on a ship model having simple superstructure and hull, as the obtained results are 
identical to values calculated manually. Figure 20 shows more detailed icing results for 
the POLARTEST ship model obtained with the developed tool and Figure 21 shows the 
superstructure deck plans and profile of the ship. 
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Figure 20. Intact stability results on test-case ship POLARTEST. 
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Figure 21. Deck plans and lateral projection of the test-case ship. 
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4 Damage stability calculations 
 
4.1
 Sample ships 
 
Selected ship model should represent as realistic case as possible, where the ship is 
already designed to fulfill the existing damage stability regulations such as in SOLAS and 
MARPOL. In case of damage stability study, it is even more important that the used ship 
model is as close to an actual ship design and has properly defined compartments and 
watertight subdivision.  
 
The ship used in damage stability study is the same ship as mentioned in the previous 
chapter concerning intact stability. FLOODSTAND-B is good reference and interesting 
for the study since it is designed to fulfill the existing regulations for this type of 
conventional passenger vessel, in accordance to SOLAS 2009 (with required index 
R=0.78222 and attained index A=0.8005) (Luhmann 2009).  
 
It also does not have double sides as it is a ship not intended for carrying substances that 
might leak out to the sea in case of an environmental accident. However some precaution 
is needed when analyzing the results, since the FLOODSTAND-B ship model is project 
ship and not gone through classification society’s inspection as ships that are meant to be 
built. It is still excellent ship model for damage case study, even though there is not 
complete certainty of A-class structures and compartment connections even though those 
details exist in the used ship model. The watertight subdivision of the FLOODSTAND-
B is illustrated in Figure 22. The watertight subdivision used in damage stability 
calculations, are presented also in higher detail in Appendix 1. 
 
Studying the damage stability with tankers or cargo vessels is not seen that interesting as 
they are usually designed to have double sides to fulfill the stability requirements and to 
prevent pollution in case of grounding or collision. The double side design is very often 
used for all types of ships intended for polar waters. According to the interview with naval 
architects Hovilainen and Vocke (2017), most of ice-going ships that Aker Arctic have 
designed, are built to have at least 760 mm double side. Reasons for this is to get easily 
the required safety level for damage stability and pollution prevention, but also to insulate 
the ship interior from outside weather.  
 
FLOODSTAND-B is also good sample ship for the calculation since it double bottom 
height larger than B/20, for which reason the Regulation 9 in SOLAS 2009, concerning 
bottom damages, is not studied in the original FLOODSTAND-B stability study 
(Luhmann 2009). The Polar Code requires always to study also bottom damage scenarios, 
as the whole submerged hull up to 20% above upper ice waterline (or 20% of damages 
longitudinal extent) is considered to experience damages (IMO 2015a). 
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Figure 22. Water tight subdivision of FLOODSTAND-B (Luhmann 2009). 
 4.2
 Damage stability tool development 
 
Polar Code adds a new damage stability requirement, which follows a deterministic 
approach. This means that the ship is exposed to a pre-determined damage scenario that 
can take place anywhere in the submerged hull and 20% above the deepest designed 
waterline. The extent of the pre-determined damage scenario is described in the Polar 
Code (2015a) as stated also earlier and below: 
 
1. the longitudinal extent is 4.5% of the upper ice waterline length if centred 
forward of the maximum breadth on the upper ice waterline, and 1.5% of upper 
ice waterline length otherwise, and shall be assumed at any longitudinal position 
along the ship's length;  
 
2. the transverse penetration extent is 760 mm, measured normal to the shell over 
the full extent of the damage; and  
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3. the vertical extent is the lesser of 20% of the upper ice waterline draught or the 
longitudinal extent, and shall be assumed at any vertical position between the keel 
and 120% of the upper ice waterline draught. 
 
To create a new tool for calculating this deterministic damage stability, it is needed to 
identify the relevant aspects that need to be taken into account. The key requirements are; 
(1) make sure all conventional hull forms work with the tool, (2) penetration in the normal 
direction of the hull is taken account correctly and (3) other damage extents by ship 
particulars are taken account correctly. 
 
Polar Code does not explain how the damage extent should be considered in bow, aft and 
bottom areas of the ship, as discussed in chapter 2.4.2. In these areas, the concepts of 
damage length and height are unambiguous. For example, is the damage height in the 
bottom of the ship measured in Y- or Z-direction? Alternatively, is the damage length 
measured in the aft ship area plainly in X-axis direction or by taking account the hull 
curvature so that the length is measured along the hull surface? 
 
In this study, these damage extents are interpreted as introduced earlier in the chapter 
2.4.2. For this reason that damage height is measured on different direction at bottom 
area, the developed tool has separate part for bottom damage filtering.  
 
The tool is developed to be easy to use and efficient in damage generation and filtering 
the relevant damages. Inputs that the user needs to give are similar what is needed in 
existing probabilistic damage generation and calculation methods. Most important input 
is the subdivision table that describes the watertight limits of the ship. The ship model 
itself needs to be prepared to such level that it has the final hull form and room 
arrangement. In addition, possible openings and other objects related to unrestricted 
flooding need be inputted for the damage generation. Openings and compartment 
connections are one important detail to be modeled and described in table format, since 
those have great effect to where the water can flow from damaged compartment. With 
these information and the measures of the damage, the damage filtering tool finds all 
possible damage scenarios that can occur in the limits given by the Polar Code.  
 
There are two main reasons why current approaches do not work with the deterministic 
damage cases as described in the Polar Code. First issue comes with setting damage 
penetration in normal direction to the hull surface. This problem was solved by 
interpreting the Polar Code rules so that damage extent is limited to an offset surface 
that is 0.76 meters inwards from the original hull in normal direction, as illustrated in 
Figure 12. The interpretation was chosen since it is conservative solution from the two 
options discussed in chapter 2.4.2. In addition, this interpretation was seen to be simpler 
and more robust to implement for the tool to be created. Without the limiting surface, 
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also rooms and watertight compartments located closer to center line of the ship would 
be included, leading to very large number of irrelevant damage cases and resulting in 
longer computation time and the risk of irrelevant damage cases being included in the 
results. 
 
Main challenge of the developed tool is the selection of the relevant damage cases. The 
issue of damage case filtering results can be approached from three directions: (1) 
required that the tool finds all relevant cases and not any wrong cases, (2) tool finds most 
of the relevant cases and not any wrong cases and (3) tool finds most of relevant cases 
and some irrelevant are left in the results. 
 
 The logic behind damage case generation in NAPA is to create all possible combinations 
of damages inside the longitudinal extent limits and watertight subdivision limits. The 
longitudinal extent in damage generation means how many adjacent compartments can 
be damaged. This is one of the inputs set by the user, ranging usually from one to three 
zones. Three adjacent-zone damage is seen possible since for example with 300 meter-
long ship the longitudinal damage extent would be 13.5 meters, which could realistically 
extend over one small watertight zone, leading to 3-zone damage. Based on this the 
damage cases are created using the watertight subdivision limits of the ship, first creating 
all single compartment damage cases, after that two compartment cases and so on, until 
all needed cases are generated. Usually this means that hundreds of damage cases are 
created, including too long, too short, too high and too low damage cases. These irrelevant 
cases need to be filtered out. In other words, only those damage cases that can be created 
by placing the ‘damage-box’ which dimension Polar Code defines, into certain location 
are relevant. The filtering of damage cases in the developed tool is based on a geometric 
study of the rooms included in the damage cases. 
 
In theory, the geometrical study of rooms involved in the damage case may seem to be 
simple. However, the geometry of rooms in the ship may be very complex and for that 
reason that there is almost infinite number of different room and watertight compartment 
geometries and combinations of compartments. For these reasons it is practically 
impossible to develop damage case filtering that is always 100% functional, finding all 
relevant damage cases and removing all irrelevant ones. For ships that have box-shaped 
watertight compartments and rooms, the damage case filtering that is developed in this 
study, should work most efficient way. 
 
The efficiency and robustness of the tool is tested with a very simple ship model that is 
designed for this testing purpose to prove that the geometry filters in the tool work as 
intended. The test ship model has box-shaped compartments and conventional hull form 
with vertically flat aft and bow. Below in Figure 23 and Figure 24 are illustrations of two 
possible damage case scenarios, illustrating how damage location has effect on which 
compartments will be flooded. 
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Figure 23. Damage in fore-area. Two zones on one deck flooded. 
 
 
Figure 24. Damage in fore-area. Three zones on three decks are flooded. Largest possible damage. 
 
Figure 23 and Figure 24 illustrates how the location of deterministic ‘damage-box’ can 
affect how many compartments are flooded. The red lines marks the limits of watertight 
compartments and which all have two non-watertight rooms inside of them. The 
dimensions of the ship and its compartments are chosen just to highlight the possibilities 
how the damage can flood various compartments in some scenarios. In real ship design, 
the situation where three adjacent compartments are flooded should be quite rare, but 
possible. More unlikely is the situation where the vertical extent of the damage reaches 
over one deck, since the vertical extent is rather small compared to typical deck spacing. 
In case of larger ships, the possibility becomes higher for both scenarios. For example for 
a 300 m-long vessel the damage’s longitudinal extent at fore area would be 13.50 m, 
 47 
 
which can realistically be the length of a compartment. A ship with draught of 15 m would 
lead to vertical extent of 3 m, if the length of the ship is more than 333.3 meters (for 
example, one of the largest passenger vessels, M/S Oasis of the Seas, has draught of 9.1 
meters and length of 360 meters). This would result the deterministic damage in the fore 
area to be 16.2 m in length and 1.82 m in vertical extent. 
 
The damage filtering is based on three main levels: (1) filtering for that damage 
penetration is not too large, (2) filtering based on damage length and (3) filtering based 
on damage height. The first filter checking that damage is not too much inside the ship is 
just a precaution since all ‘damage-boxes’ are already limited to the offset surface of the 
hull, that is 0.76 meters inwards from hull, at the damage generation phase, which is done 
automatically in NAPA for Design software.  
 
The filtering based on damage length includes two main checks. In three-zone damages 
the middle zone cannot be too long so that ‘damage-box’ reaches to all zones. The second 
main check is that single-zones damages cannot be too short. If the zone length is less 
than the damage length, the resulted damage will always be larger and because smaller 
damage cases are not included as per Polar Code, these cases are irrelevant. Third possible 
damage case in respect to length is two-zone damage. These should be usually be always 
possible cases, however the inspection for too short cases is included in the tool in a 
similar way as for one-zone damages. The damage length information for each case is 
obtained from table that NAPA damage generation produces automatically with the help 
of subdivision table created by the user.   
 
The filtering for damage height is based on room geometry. The filtering tool inspects 
which rooms are included in the damage case and reduces the volume of the rooms that 
is more than 0.76 meters inside the hull. The resulted rooms describe the potential area 
and space where the ‘damage-box’ can be placed. Using these rooms the tool checks the 
second most highest and second lowest limits of the rooms. If distance between these 
points is less than damages vertical extent, damage is included.  
 
The developed tool for damage generation and damage case filtering works as described 
below: 
 
1. User inputs: subdivision, compartments and compartment limit table, 
hull for damage calculation, table for results and designed highest ice 
waterline. 
2. 0.76m smaller offset hull surface is created and smaller damage hull 
from it. 
3. Coordinate system of the project is checked and taken into account 
4. All damages based on the subdivision are generated with NAPA built-
in feature, penetration is limited to the created offset hull 
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5. A check is made to filter out damage cases in which compartments are 
inside the offset hull and thus relevant, cases having compartments too 
much inside are removed 
6. Damage cases having compartments completely below double bottom 
are removed, damage cases at double bottom area are considered later 
7. Damages are filtered by length in fore and aft part of the ship using 
damage extent information from automatically created table based on 
the subdivision table 
8. Damages are filtered by height using the information of rooms upper 
and lower limits that are included in the damage case. The used rooms 
are reduced so that they describe only the area/volume at 0.76 m extent 
from hull 
9. Empty and duplicate damage cases are removed 
 
 
The functionality of the developed tool is verified with the test-case ship model 
POLARTEST. The subdivision of the POLARTEST is simple with vertical and 
horizontal bulkheads, making the watertight compartments to be box-shaped apart from 
the side that is limited to the hull. The compartment limits are selected such way that 
irrelevant cases and relevant cases are easy to notice when analyzing the results. 
Verification of filters is carried out manually, inspecting all resulted damage cases that 
are remained after using the tool. Results are gathered in Table 6 below showing the how 
the amount of relevant cases decreases after each filter. The damage extents for 
POLARTEST are 4.5 meters in length at fore area and 1.5 meters at aft, and 0.9 meters 
in height at fore area and 0.3 meters at aft. 
 
Table 6. POLARTEST, damage case filtering test results. 
 Port, side Port, bottom Starboard, side Starboard, 
bottom 
All possibilities 642 65 642 65 
After 
offset/limit filter 
447 65 447 65 
After length 
filter 
244 25 244 25 
After height 
filter 
149 20 149 25 
After empty-
case filter 
149 20 149 25 
After duplicate 
filter 
142 20 142 25 
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Manual verification of resulted damage cases proves that the developed tool works as 
intended with the simple test-case ship, finding all relevant damage cases. Testing of the 
damage generation and filtering tool with test-case ship POLARTEST proved the tool is 
capable to filter out all irrelevant cases and find all relevant damage cases. The test-case 
ship has 150 rooms in the area where the damages can occur. The room limits are same 
as the subdivision limits. The compartments and subdivision are symmetrical over the 
centerline. All possible damage cases, limiting to offset surface and reaching from one to 
three zones located over the whole draught of the ship, accounts to 1414 damage cases 
including both sides of the ship, including the bottom areas. After filtering the potentially 
relevant cases based on the length and vertical height requirements, total of 329 relevant 
damage cases are found.  
 
The tool account the bottom damages exactly the same way as side damages, apart from 
the differences that damages vertical extent is measured in Y-axis direction (at the bottom 
area noted as transversal extent) and that damage height filtering is slightly different. The 
difference in transversal extent filtering comes from the centerline, as some of the 
compartments may extent over it. In these cases the damage’s transversal extent is limited 
to start or begin at center line. Figure 25 illustrates the situation. 
 
 
Figure 25. Compartment (marked with blue highlight) extending over centerline at bottom area. 
 
The used subdivision of the test-case ship model can be found in the Appendix 6. The 
number of relevant damages in case of 100 meter-long ship may be larger than for real 
ships, since the spacing of the bulkheads is very short at some hull areas for the testing 
purposes. These areas of tighter bulkhead spacing are aft, amidships and fore. Amidships 
area is especially interesting as there the damage length value changes as the rule defines. 
These three areas cover different scenarios by the damage length to be used and the 
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placement of the bulkheads is carried out so that all possible combinations of damages 
are occurring. With different bulkhead and deck spacing the functionality of the tool can 
be validated for the simple box shaped compartments. 
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5 Results 
 
5.1
 Intact stability 
 
Example calculations of intact stability due to icing are done to further validate the 
functionality of developed tool and showcase how the icing affects different ship models 
that are designed before the Polar Code came into force and not thus not designed 
especially for these requirements. The loading conditions used in the calculations are 
aimed to represent the extreme loading situations that are still expected to be used at sea, 
representing a fully loaded ship and a ship in lighter loading condition when arriving to 
port with little or no cargo. The intact stability calculations are carried out with port side 
heel (positive angles). 
 
Ice accumulation and its effects on ship stability are depending only on the shape of the 
superstructure, ships loading condition and hull form. In addition relevant openings are 
used, which may potentially decrease the angle of down flooding. This requirements 
makes it possible to use also so-called ‘demo projects’ for intact stability calculation that 
represent actual ships well enough for the hull form, loading condition and by the 
superstructure. The used NAPA in-build ‘demo projects’ are a bulk carrier and a naval 
frigate. The ice accumulation calculation is carried out also with the FLOODSTAND-B, 
which is introduced already in earlier chapters. These three example cases should describe 
the effect of icing rather well for different ship types. 
 
The results include also two experimental studies. One of these experimental scenarios 
describe situation where ice accretion is 10 times higher than Polar Code defines (being 
300 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 for deck areas and 75 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 for lateral projection). The other special case 
studies situation where icing occurs unsymmetrically, and only one side (port side studied 
in this case) of the ship is experiencing icing with the ice accretion values described in 
Polar Code. Aim of these experimental cases is to study more extreme icing scenarios 
that are still somewhat possible according to icing related literature and the probability of 
conditions exceeding these scenarios should be very small. 
 
The example calculations use the basic IMO IS2008 criteria group, which is intended for 
all ship types, as test criteria to assess the effects of icing. The phrasing in the Polar Code 
requires that ‘...icing allowance shall be made in the stability calculations...’ which can 
be interpret so that icing needs to be considered in all relevant intact stability criteria for 
the ship in question. Since relevant criteria are different for different vessels, 11 basic 
intact stability criteria are selected for the example calculations. The intact stability 
criteria used are described in Table 7 below. 
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Table 7. Criteria used for intact stability calculations. 
Name Type requirement 
Area under GZ curve up to 30 
deg 
MINAREA 0.055 [mrad] 
Area under GZ curve up to 40 
deg 
MINAREA 0.09 [mrad] 
Area under GZ curve between 
30 and 40 deg 
MINAREA 0.03 [mrad] 
Minimum GZ > 0.2 MAXGZ 0.2 [m] 
Max. GZ at an angle > 25 deg. POSMAX 25 [deg] 
GM > 0.15 m MINGM 0.15 [m] 
Max. heel due to crowding of 
passengers 
MAXHEEL 10 [deg] 
Max. heel due to turning MAXHEEL 10 [deg] 
IMO weather criterion Area ratio 1 
HEEL < 16 deg MAXHEEL 16 [deg] 
HEEL < 80% of FRB immersion MAXHEEL Free board=<0.8 [deg] 
 
5.1.1 Passenger ship FLOODSTAND-B 
 
Passenger ship is interesting in respect of icing since they usually have large lateral 
projection area and large deck areas far away from sea surface. These lead to relatively 
large amount of icing since ice accretion is directly linked to exposed areas of the ship. 
The used ship model of FLOODSTAND-B is rather coarse for the modelling in the 
superstructure area, but has realistic projection area and highest deck. Some limitations 
are caused by the lack of balconies and more detailed sundecks that are supposed to 
partially extent on the three highest decks. Inputs used for the intact stability calculation 
of FLOODSTAND-B are presented in Table 8. As a remark, the reason why ships 
waterline length is greater in light loading condition is that the bulb is not completely 
submerged. 
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Table 8. Initial conditions and inputs for intact stability calculations due to ice accretion on FLOODSTAND-B. 
 Light loading condition Heavy loading condition 
𝐿𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 227.1 220.86 
𝐵𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 32.2 32.2 
T [m] 6.90  7.4 
Trim [m] -0.069 -0.066 
Heel [deg] 0 0 
Displacement [ton] 32251.8 35367.1 
CoG [m] (99.73, 0, 15.44) (99.48, 0, 14.90) 
GM [m] 2.62 2.70 
KG [m] 15.44 14.90 
Immersion angle of 
freeboard [deg] 
33.2 31 
Criteria check 11/11 OK 11/11 OK 
Decks locations [m] Z=16, Z=19.8, Z =20.8, 
Z=39.8 
Z =16, Z =19.8, Z =20.8, 
Z=39.8 
 
As a result of using the intact stability tool for taking into account ice accretion, the effect 
of icing is shown in Table 9. Total amount of ice accumulated for lighter loading 
condition is 377.7 tons and the center of gravity foe this ice mass is located at X=101.73 
m, Y=0.02 m and Z=29.88 m. For the heavier loading condition the values are 
respectively 375.9 tons and the center of gravity foe this ice mass is located at X=101.70 
m, Y=0.02 m and Z=29.99 m. 
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Table 9. Results of icing on passenger ship. 
 Light loading 
condition 
with ice 
accretion 
Full loading 
condition with 
ice accretion 
Light loading 
condition with 
10X larger 
icing 
Light loading 
condition with 
unsymmetrical 
icing (P-side) 
T [m] 6.961 7.47 8.02 6.93 
Trim [m] -0.09 -0.09 -0.29 -0.08 
Heel [deg] 0.0 0.0  0.1 1.1 
Displacement 
[ton] 
32629.5 35743.0 39144.1 32440.6 
CoG [m] (99.93, 0, 
15.61) 
(99.45, 0, 
15.06) 
(99.7, 0, 16.35) (99.74, 0.05, 
15.52) 
GM [m] 2.39 2.49 0.77 2.51 
KG [m] 15.61 15.06 16.35 14.98 
Immersion 
angle of 
freeboard [deg] 
33 30.9 30.8 33.1 
Criteria check 11/11 OK 11/11 OK 9/11 OK 11/11 OK 
Mass [ton] & 
CoG of ice [m] 
377.7 tons at  
(101.73, 0, 
29.88) 
375.9 tons at  
(101.70, 0, 
29.99) 
 
3777.0 tons at 
(101.73, 0, 
29.88) 
188.8 tons at 
(101.73, 8.07, 
29.88) 
 
FLOODSTAND-B passed all studied criteria with both studied loading conditions where 
icing is considered as in Polar Code. The total mass of ice for this type and size of vessel 
is high, resulting GM value to decrease approximately 8.8% in case of light service 
loading condition, decrease of 7.8% in case of heavy loading condition. The loading 
conditions used corresponds closely to lightest service floating position and heaviest 
loading condition when draught is at deepest subdivision draught.  
 
However ten times higher icing with light loading condition led to failing of two criteria 
studied, and is thus potentially dangerous for studied ship. The case of unsymmetrical 
icing did not pose danger for ship stability, only noticeable effect was the increase of heel 
from zero to 1.1 degrees, when comparing the result to actual icing scenarios that Polar 
Code defines. The list of criteria with required and attained values are shown in Appendix 
4. The effect of icing can be seen also from the GZ curve figures below. 
 
The GZ curves decrease clearly and the angle of vanishing stability, where GZ value goes 
to zero, decreases roughly 1.5 degrees. This applies for both loading conditions studied 
with the ice accretion values as in Polar Code.  
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Figure 26. FLOODSTAND-B, GZ-curves of light loading condition with (red) and without icing (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 27. FLOODSTAND-B, GZ-curves of heavy loading condition with (red) and without icing 
(green). 
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Figure 28. FLOODSTAND-B, GZ-curves of light loading condition with 10X higher icing (red) and 
without (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 29. FLOODSTAND, GZ-curves of light loading condition with unsymmetrical icing (red) and 
without icing (green). 
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5.1.2 Bulk carrier 
 
The cargo ship used for the example calculation is the one of the so-called demo projects 
included in NAPA software, describing a mid-sized bulk carrier. The main dimensions of 
the vessel and used inputs for intact stability calculation are in below Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Initial conditions and inputs for intact stability calculations due to ice accretion on a cargo ship. 
 Light loading condition Heavy loading condition 
𝐿𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 220.47 220.53 
𝐵𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 36.00 36.00 
T [m] 11.16 14.55 
Trim [m] 0.92 4.10 
Heel [deg] 3.9 2.9 
Displacement [ton] 73466.5 98449.9 
CoG [m] (116.90, 0.66, 9.30) (118.73, 0.39, 11.45) 
GM [m] 3.76 3.69 
KG [m] 9.30 11.45 
Immersion angle 
(ope or FRB) [deg] 
27.7 15.7 
Criteria check 11/11 OK 11/11 OK 
Deck locations [m] Z=21.00, Z=23.50, Z=24.20, 
Z=25.00, Z=29.80, Z=35.40, 
Z=38.20 
Z=21.00, Z=23.50, Z=24.20, 
Z=25.00, Z=29.80, Z=35.40, 
Z=38.20 
 
The light loading condition represents light ballast loading condition and the heavy 
loading condition is the departure loading condition when all holds are full and ship is 
sailing with deep draught. The loading conditions are aimed to represent the extreme 
loading situations that are still expected to be used at sea, to reveal the effect of icing. 
However, the demo ship and its loading conditions do not necessarily represent 
completely realistic scenarios. Total amount of ice accumulated for the light loading 
condition is 268.9 tons and the center of gravity for this ice mass is located at X=105.50 
m, Y=0 m and Z=21.91 m. For the heavier loading condition the values are respectively 
257.2 tons and the center of gravity for this ice mass is located at X=105.23 m, Y=0 m 
and Z=22.45 m. The effects to floating position and stability related values after ice 
accretion are shown in Table 11 below. 
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Table 11. Results of icing on bulk carrier. 
 Light loading 
condition 
with ice 
accretion 
Heavy loading 
condition with 
ice accretion 
Light loading 
condition 
with 10X 
larger icing 
Light loading 
condition with 
unsymmetrical 
icing (P-side) 
T [m] 11.19 14.58 11.44 11.13 
Trim [m] 0.912 4.10 0.80 0.895 
Heel [deg] 3.9 3.0 4.1 4.1 
Displacement 
[ton] 
73701.5 98671.3 75508 73289.6 
CoG [m] (116.87, 
0.66, 9.34) 
(118.70, 0.39, 
11.48) 
(116.5, 0.25, 
9.64) 
(116.87, 0.27, 
9.27) 
GM [m] 3.72 3.67 3.45 3.81 
KG [m] 9.34 11.48 9.64 9.27 
Immersion 
angle of 
freeboard [deg] 
27.8 15.5 27 28 
Criteria check 11/11 OK 11/11 OK  11/11 OK 11/11 OK 
Mass [ton] & 
CoG of ice [m] 
235.29 tons 
at (105.50, 0, 
21.91) 
 
221.30 tons at 
(105.23, 0, 
22.45) 
2352.9 tons 
at (105.39,  
0.00, 21.90) 
134.5 tons at 
(105.38, 9.00, 
21.78) 
 
The results reveal that icing has very little effect on the studied cargo ship, and all criteria 
are met in every studied icing scenario. Reason for this is that bulkers are designed to sail 
with very deep draught, but they can also sail with smaller draught when no cargo is 
loaded and ballast water is used to adjust the floating position. 
 
In the case of light loading condition, GM value is decreased by approximately 1.1%. 
Using the departure loading condition where ship is fully loaded, the GM decreases 0.5%. 
Even the ten times larger icing does not have significant effect on draught, KG and GM 
values. Also the unsymmetrically accumulated icing do not have very large effect on the 
ship, as the ship has already heel in its original loading conditions. In fact the 
unsymmetrically located ice mass balances the ship in this case. The list of criteria with 
required and attained values are shown in Appendix 4. The effect of icing can be seen 
also from the GZ curve figures below. 
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Figure 30. BULK CARRIER, GZ-curves of light loading condition with (red) and without icing (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 31. BULK CARRIER, GZ-curves of heavy loading condition with (red) and without icing (green). 
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Figure 32. BULK CARRIER, GZ-curves of light loading condition with 10X higher icing (red) and 
without icing (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 33. BULK CARRIER, GZ-curves of light loading condition with unsymmetrical icing (red) and 
without icing (green). 
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5.1.3 Naval frigate 
 
The naval frigate used for this example calculation is also NAPA demo project. The main 
dimensions and floating positions of loading conditions of the vessel for criteria checks 
are shown in below Table 12. Naval vessels are designed usually with certain country 
specific naval rules, so studying the intact stability of such vessel with IMO criteria is in 
that sense not adequate. However, using here the IMO criteria provides indication about 
the effects of ice accretion and makes the comparison easier with other ship types. 
 
Table 12. Initial conditions and inputs for intact stability calculations due to ice accretion on naval frigate. 
 Light loading condition  Heavy loading condition 
𝐿𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 136.85 138.00 
𝐵𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  [m] 15.35 15.63 
T [m] 4.01 4.460 
Trim [m] -0.815 0.116 
Heel [deg] 0 0 
Displacement [ton] 4070 4699.7 
CoG [m] (65.78, 0, 7.38) (67.60, 0, 6.59) 
GM [m] 0.28 0. 96 
KG [m] 7.38  6.59 
Immersion angle of 
freeboard [deg] 
36.5 33.5 
Criteria check 11/11 OK 11/11 OK 
Deck locations [m] z=9.40, z=12.40, z=15.40, 
z=16.40, z=18.40, z=21.40 
z=9.40, z=12.40, z=15.40, 
z=16.40, z=18.40, z=21.40 
 
The light loading condition represents light arrival loading condition and the heavy 
loading condition is the departure loading condition when the ship is sailing with deep 
draught. The loading conditions are aimed to represent the extreme loading situations that 
are still expected to be used at sea, to reveal the effect of icing. However, the demo ship 
and its loading conditions do not necessarily represent completely realistic scenarios. 
Total amount of ice accumulated for the light loading condition is 79.2 tons and the center 
of gravity foe this ice mass is located at X=56.39 m, Y=0 m and Z=10.84 m. For the 
heavier loading condition the values are respectively 78.3 tons and the center of gravity 
foe this ice mass is located at X=55.94 m, Y=0 m and Z=10.93 m. The GZ curves in 
below figures involving light loading condition show rapid increase of GZ value after 
about 30 degree heel. This is caused because the light loading condition that has very 
shallow draught and the hull form of the vessel. The hull form changes more rapidly 
closer to free board and leads to larger GZ as hull is wider  The effects to floating position 
and stability related values after ice accretion are shown in Table 13 below. 
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Table 13. Results of icing on naval frigate. 
 Light 
loading 
condition 
with ice 
accretion 
Heavy loading 
condition with 
ice accretion 
Light loading 
condition 
with 10X 
larger icing 
Light loading 
condition with 
unsymmetrical 
icing (P-side) 
T [m] 4.06 4.50 3.24 3.94 
Trim [m] -0.84 0.08 0.08 -0.73 
Heel [deg] 0 0 34.3 9.3 
Displacement 
[ton] 
4149.2 4778.0 4862.4 4108.9 
CoG [m] (65.07, 0.00, 
7.45 
(67.42, 0, 6.66) (63.80,  0.00,  
7.94) 
(65.15, 0.04, 
7.41) 
GM [m] 0.22 0.90 -0.20 0.25 
KG [m] 7.45 6.66 7.94 7.41 
Immersion 
angle of 
freeboard [deg] 
35.5 
 
32.2 29.8 35.7 
Criteria check 7/11 OK 11/11 OK 1/11 OK 9/11 OK 
Mass [ton] & 
CoG of ice [m] 
77.8 tons at  
(56.10, 0.00, 
10.70) 
76.8 tons at 
(55.64, 0.00, 
10.78) 
777.6 tons at 
(56.10, 0.00, 
10.70) 
38.9 tons at 
(56.10, 4.35, 
10.70) 
 
The effect of ice on the superstructure decreases the GM values relatively large amount, 
but the absolute change in the GM values is approximately 0.05 meters for both loading 
conditions. In lightship loading condition, the GM value decreases 21.4% and in the 
heavier departure loading condition, the relative decrease of GM is 6.25%. The GZ curves 
reveal that the accumulated ice has rather significant effect on the ship stability, lowering 
the maximum GZ value around 20%. In addition, the angle of vanishing stability 
decreases a bit over 2 degrees. For the heavier loading condition, the effect of icing is 
smaller. GZ curve lowers around 6% and angle of vanishing stability is practically same 
as without icing. 
 
Ten times larger ice accretion has tremendous effect on the stability of the ship in studied 
light loading condition, leading to failing in almost all criteria. Also the unsymmetrical 
icing leads to failing of three criteria with studied ship at light loading condition. The list 
of criteria with required and attained values are shown in Appendix 4. The effect of icing 
can be seen also from the GZ curve figures below. 
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Figure 34. Frigate, GZ-curves of light loading condition with (red) and without icing (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Frigate, GZ-curves of heavy loading condition with (red) and without icing (green). 
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Figure 36. Frigate, GZ-curves of light loading condition with 10X icing (red) and without (green). 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Frigate, GZ-curves of light loading condition with unsymmetrical icing (red) and without icing 
(green). 
 
 65 
 
5.1.4 Example output of results produced with the tool 
 
The detailed results of ice accretion on the studied three example ships are presented in 
sub chapters 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. Example output of ice accretion results, produced by 
the developed tool, is shown in Figure 38. Complete output with criteria checks and the 
illustration of exposed decks and lateral projection, produced by the tool, and are shown 
in Appendix 5. The results show the amount of ice accumulated on superstructure’s 
vertical areas as given in user input describing the Z-coordinate locations of the decks 
and other vertical areas. The results describe also the ice accumulated on ships’ lateral 
projection. Illustrative figures describing the vertical areas and lateral projection are 
shown in Figures 39-41. It is worth noting again that the illustrative figures show the 
offset sections below the deck locations, meaning they do not represent the actual exposed 
area. Lateral projection in the figures showcase the projection as in lighter loading 
condition. For the actual results, these surface areas are taken account correctly as 
described in chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 38. Example output produced with the tool, FLOODSTAND-B icing values for studied loading 
conditions. 
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Figure 39. FLOODSTAND. Illustration of decks and side projection used in icing calculation, produced 
by the tool. 
 
 
Figure 40. Bulk carrier. Illustration of decks and side projection used in icing calculation, produced by the 
tool. 
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Figure 41. Frigate. Illustration of decks and side projection used in icing calculation, produced by the tool. 
 
5.2
 Damage stability 
 
Damage stability results represent the effect of the deterministic damage scenario on 240 
meter-long passenger ship FLOODSTAND-B. The FLOODSTAND-B is not originally 
designed with this type of stability requirement in mind but only according to SOLAS 
probabilistic damage stability rule. This subchapter contributes also by validating the 
usefulness of the developed tool. The ship model studied is the FLOODSTAND-B ship 
that was introduced in more detail under chapters 3 and 4. 
 
The use of  NAPA ‘demo projects’, as used in intact stability example calculations, are 
not adequate for damage stability study since they do not represent an actual ship project 
that is designed realistically to fulfill relevant regulations and is meant to be actually built. 
Using non-realistic ship model for the example calculations would lead to non-realistic 
results which could not be used for reliable analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Passenger ship FLOODSTAND-B 
 
The study of ice related damage stability has two main steps, which are: (1) identifying 
the relevant damage cases and then (2) the calculation of the required stability criterion. 
Identification of the relevant damage cases is carried out with the developed tool which 
follows the interpretation and damage dimension as introduced in chapter 2.4.2. The 
number of all potential one to three zone length damages with the FLOODSTAND-B is 
1589, consisting of 558 port-side damages and 558 starboard-side damages, these 
numbers include also the potential relevant damages at bottom area. These values 
highlight the need for filtering tool to find at least most of the relevant cases. Below Table 
14 presents how different filtering steps reduce the amount of damage cases towards the 
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end of the filtering, revealing final relevant cases and. Last row in Table 14 shows the 
results of criteria check, which reveals 13 of the 240 relevant cases do not meet the criteria 
requirement. 
 
The damage extents for the FLOODSTAND-B are 9.94 meters for damage length at fore 
area and 3.31 meter at aft area, and for the damage height 1.48 meters at fore area and 
0.66 at aft area. The penetration value of 760 mm is set by an offset surface of the hull, 
which acts also as a limit for the damage generation so that no deeper damage cases is 
created. After the damage generation and filtering is carried out for both sides of the ship, 
total of 240 relevant damage cases if found which damage stability needs to be studied in 
respect to factor 𝑆𝑖. More detailed list of relevant cases found by the filtering is shown in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Table 14. FLOODSTAND-B, damage case filtering and process of the tool. 
 Port, side Port, bottom Starboard, side Starboard, 
bottom 
All possibilities 348 447 348 446 
After 
offset/limit 
251 346 269 297 
After length 
filter 
213 132 231 113 
After height 
filter 
141  77 141 96 
After empty 
delete 
141 77 141 96 
After  
duplicate del. 
83 35 81 41 
Cases fulfilling 
criteria (R=1) 
77/83 OK 35/35 OK 74/81 OK 41/41 OK 
 
Explaining the function of the tool in more detail with port side damage cases, the first 
step of the tool generates the damages located on side area and removing damages below 
the double bottom, as the bottom area of the hull is processed later. After the damage 
cases that are having rooms below double bottom are removed and also cases that are 
more than the offset distance inside the ship, the number of cases to be filtered is 
decreased to 251. After the length filtering, the amount of relevant damage cases is 
reduced to 213, after which the height filter selects damage cases inside the limits of 
vertical extent, leaving 141 relevant damage cases. This number may still include empty 
and duplicate damage cases, depending how the subdivision table is created. Removing 
also the duplicates and empty cases, the final amount of relevant damages at port side is 
141, meaning no empty cases were present in this case. Finally after removing the 
duplicate cases from the results, 83 relevant damage cases is left. These cases can be then 
used for damage stability calculation, however manual inspection of the damage cases is 
always recommendable before final statement can be done about damage stability. 
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Damages at the bottom area for starboard-side accounts at first 447 cases, decreasing to 
346 after filter that removes cases that have rooms further away from the hull than 760 
mm. Same damage length and height filtering as for side-area damages above, number of 
relevant cases decreases first to 132 and after height filter to 77. Finally removing 
duplicate and empty cases, leaves 35 relevant damage cases at port side bottom area. 
 
In the scope of usefulness and reliability of the tool, most important goal is that all 
relevant cases,  meaning the cases that are in accordance to Polar Code damage extents, 
are included in the results and none relevant case is left out. Secondary goal is that the 
resulted cases do not include irrelevant damage cases, since it is more laborious to search 
for more relevant cases manually than just leaving the irrelevant, but potentially harmless 
cases, in the results.  
 
Manual study of the resulted damage cases revealed that the tool was able to find all 
possible damage scenarios, but the results included also some irrelevant cases. These 
irrelevant cases were mostly located below double bottom and having too large 
penetration value for being located below double bottom. Also some complex shaped 
room combinations having too high deck-spacing were included due to failing of damage-
height filtering. 
 
The damage stability calculation was carried out for the resulted damage cases. Inputs 
used for the stability calculation represented the deepest subdivision draught scenario and 
using subdivision, compartment connections and relevant openings as described in the 
study by Luhmann (2009) concerning the probabilistic damage stability of 
FLOODSTAND-B. With these inputs, 13 (of the 240 relevant damage cases) damage 
case as defined in Polar Code lead to 𝑺𝒊 index < 1. This means that the studied passenger 
ship does not fulfill the Polar Code requirements for damage stability. Below Figure 42 
shows damage case where the factor 𝑆𝑖 reaches smallest value (being 𝑆𝑖 = 0). 
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Figure 42. FLOODSTAND-B, damage case of smallest value of survivability factor 
 
Summary of the critical damage cases by their type is presented in below Table 15. The 
table visualizes well, that most of the critical damage cases not fulfilling the criteria are 
two-zone cases, and that no three-zone cases fit in the limits of ‘damage-box’ defined by 
Polar Code with the studied passenger ship. Also most of the critical damages are two-
zone damages, since naturally larger damages have larger effect on ship stability.  
 
Table 15. Sumary of the damage cases not fulfilling the criteria by type. 
 P-side P-bottom S-side S-bottom 
Critical dam. / 
1-zone 
2/30 0/17 0/29 0/19 
Critical dam. / 
2-zone 
4/53 0/18 7/53 0/23 
Critical dam. /  
3-zone 
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
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With the studied passenger vessel eight of the failing damage scenarios were caused by 
one particular critical opening just above to the waterline level inside a large 
compartment. For example staircases in large compartments such as engine rooms are in 
this case easily leading to failing in the Polar Code criterion. The reason why these 
opening are critical is that they reduce the range value used in the survivability factor 
calculation and resulting small values for factor 𝑆𝑖. 
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6 Discussion 
 
6.1
 Intact stability 
 
The intact stability requirement in Polar Code was found straight forward to implement 
as a tool for stability calculation. The results of ice accretion did not pose alarmingly 
direct danger for the used example ships apart from the naval frigate which was not 
fulfilling some criteria in light loading condition. Passenger ship and bulk carrier passed 
all studied IMO criteria in heavy and light loading conditions. 
 
The history of icing on ships and ocean structures is clearly recorded and studied. 
However the values used in the Polar Code for icing allowances are not very close to the 
extreme values that can occur in the polar waters, and represent rather modest ice 
accretion. This was supported by the interview of experienced naval architects who stated 
that several times higher ice accretion values have been used in the past for some ship 
designs due to classification society requirement, and considering the current Polar Code 
icing value to be rather low (Hovilainen & Vocke 2017). The history of the intact stability 
rule for icing may be one explaining factor, as the rule was originally defined for fishing 
vessels. 
 
Studying the stability of the example ships with 10 times larger icing values revealed that 
the studied passenger vessel and naval frigate failed to fulfill the used stability criteria. 
Higher icing values were not as critical for the studied bulk carrier. 
 
The studied scenario of uneven icing (port side icing only) revealed that it is not more 
critical scenario for the studied passenger ship and bulk carrier, as all criteria were 
fulfilled. The studied naval frigate showed that unsymmetrical icing is actually leading to 
less failures with the studied criteria, compared symmetric icing as Polar Code defines. 
 
This study provided evidence that there is potential need for reviewing of the intact 
stability rules in Polar Code. It is at least suspicious that same icing requirements are used 
similarly for large cargo ships and passenger vessels, as originally intended for fishing 
vessels. However the difference in ship sizes and purposes is not a major concern. The 
main reason for the potential need for reviewing the intact stability rules lies in the full-
scale measurements of icing of actual icing incidents and also in the statements provided 
by the arctic ship designers.  
 
Last aspect worth noticing is the assumption of symmetrical and even icing of ship 
structures. More likely and extreme scenarios would be that only one side of the ship or 
that only bow area experiences icing, resulting a larger shift in the location of center of 
gravity compared to situation without icing. Even though the results showed that the 
difference is not large or between symmetric and unsymmetrical icing, different options 
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for icing consideration could be worthwhile to study further, including as realistic 
scenarios as possible. 
6.2
 Damage stability 
 
Damage stability requirements in Polar Code proved to be a bit unclearly defined. The 
background of the damage extents remained partially unsolved as no thorough 
explanation was to be found for the extent values. 
 
An educated guess and reasoning led to a conclusion that the damage length and vertical 
height are derived from accident kinematics, based on which it can be roughly assumed 
that larger ship with more mass (and thus more kinetic energy) results larger damage. The 
damage penetration value remained unsolved. Only hint comes from the value itself being 
uneven for metric system. This indicates to the time before year 1974, when for example 
SOLAS convention still used imperial units. As a penetration value due to ice impact, the 
760 mm is seen to be adequate, even though the reason for the selection of such value is 
not completely clear (Hovilainen & Vocke 2017). 
 
Interpretation of the shape of the ‘damage-box’ is not stated clearly in the Polar Code. 
Especially the hull areas where hull has curvature causes problems when setting the limits 
for the damage box. Another unclearly defined part of the rule is how to interpret the 
damage extents at bottom area. This study offered on way of interpretations for these 
issues, as no official statements were available at the time. The selected interpretation 
was chosen since it can be implemented ambiguously for all hull areas and is simpler for 
the developed tool to be used in the damage case filtering. 
 
As damage stability regulation concerns only new-builds, the damage stability 
requirement does not directly cause difficulties for existing ships to gain the Polar Ship 
Certificate as it can be taken into account in the design phase as any requirement affecting 
the ship structures. For new-builds, the rule concerns more precisely only A and B 
category ships, for which design the damage stability requirement should not be major 
obstacle. For example the use of double sides in addition to double bottom should 
effectively prevent critical damages in respect to ship stability (Hovilainen & Vocke 
2017). 
 
The damage stability case study revealed that the studied 2009 SOLAS passenger ship 
does not survive from all damage scenarios that Polar Code requires to take into account. 
13 of the 240 relevant damage cases did not pass the criteria check where requirement for 
survivability factor is 𝑆𝑖 = 1. The result suggest that the existing ships following SOLAS 
2009 probabilistic damage stability criteria are potentially vulnerable for such damage 
scenarios as Polar Code defines. This suggests also that new-build category C ships are 
also potentially vulnerable for such damage scenarios as defined by Polar Code. 
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The new-builds in Polar Code category C, and other vessels having IACS ice class lower 
than PC-7 are in greatest danger of having catastrophic ice damage. Even though some of 
the category C ships are not even intended to be sailed at sea areas where ice is present, 
bits of ice can drift away from glaciers and ice sheets, which is a risk also for category C 
ships having lower ice class below PC-7. The accident cases of MS Finnpolaris and MV 
Explorer highlights the danger of multi-year that might difficult to notice in bad weather 
conditions or in darkness, even if the ship has proper ice class. 
 
Since the damage extents due to ice impact are in relation to the ship mass and speed, one 
way to reduce the effects of collision would be require lower speeds at areas where ice 
may occur. Another way is naturally to build ships with higher ice class, this may not be 
always solution since also category C ships will most definitely exists, and also other 
existing ships with inferior ice class. Thus lowering speeds at higher-risk areas would be 
easy to implement especially for passenger ships where many lives are at risk and the 
need for time saving is lesser than with cargo ships. However it does not remove the risk 
for a ship sailing too fast for example by human error and colliding with ice. Currently 
the concept of lowering speeds is implemented in the IACS guidelines for artic shipping 
but not as a requirement (LBMA 2009). Thus making it mandatory for category C ships 
would be worth considering and studying more. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Polar Code is a goal orientated set of rules for ships intended for Arctic and Antarctic 
operations. The methods how to achieve the goals, are left mostly for the ship designer to 
decide. The stability related rules are one of the most accurately defined rules in Polar 
Code, having exact values for ice accretion and damage extents, compared to some other 
requirements that require to consider certain aspects of ship design, leaving more room 
for interpretation. 
 
In the damage stability rule the shape of the ‘damage-box’ applied on ship, to describe 
the ice related damage, has room for interpretation. One aspect not mentioned in the rules 
is should also different floating position be studied when locating the damage scenarios, 
as for some ships trim can vary significantly in different operations. Also the rules does 
not state should the icing and damage scenarios be studied when occurring at same time. 
Since the simultaneous situation is not mentioned, it can be understood that it is not 
necessary, however source was found guiding to study both scenarios at same time. This 
may be something were different classification societies or authorities have their own 
requirements. 
 
As no official interpretation for damage extents and shape was to be found available, this 
study offers one solution. In short, damages transversal penetration is limited to an offset 
surface located at 0.76 meters from hull inwards, and damage extents are limited to this 
surface perpendicularly to longitudinal axis of the ship. At bottom area the damage’s 
vertical height is measured in transversal direction, as the vertical height is at those areas 
limited to the offset surface.  
 
Both stability rules should represent a realistic scenario that may pose danger for ship 
stability. From sensibility point-of-view, meaning what kind of operational situations the 
requirements describe, the study suggests that Polar Code does not represent extreme 
situations or sea conditions. For the intact stability requirement even higher ice accretion 
values could be seen justified. Even though the current way defines icing to be considered 
on high locations where icing should be minimal, making the rule more conservative. The 
damage extents in the rule concerning ships damage stability, are seen adequate. The only 
concern is that the requirement does not include category C ships, as it would be major 
accident if passenger vessels of category C would encounter severe collision with piece 
of multiyear ice. Also more extreme interpretation would include both icing and damage 
scenario to be occurring at same time. 
 
The partial goal of the study was to develop tools to account ice accretion and to find the 
relevant damage cases as Polar Code defines the situation. The tool development achieved 
its goals, enabling the case studies of intact and damage stability for example ships. The 
intact stability tool achieved very good results as manual verification of the results in 
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development phase were found to be correct. As a tool, the intact stability tool is very 
simple by its functioning, as it takes planar sections of the deck and calculates areas and 
center of gravity -locations of each exposed decks and also from the lateral projection of 
the ship. The simple geometrical 2D approach decreases the possibility of errors, as 
amount of special or complex situations is limited. 
 
The tool for identifying the relevant damage cases proved to work correctly in 
development phase with simple test-case ship model. However it was noticed that real 
ships having more complex compartment geometries are practically impossible to take 
account correctly. The tool developed in this time-frame of the study was found to be able 
to found the relevant damage cases, but still some irrelevant cases were included in the 
results. 
 
Both tools proved to work as a good help for a ship designer, making the process more 
efficient, but still some work is left that the tools cannot do, especially in the case of 
identifying the relevant damage cases having several compartments with complex shapes. 
However in most cases the effects of icing and ice related damages could be studied with 
the help of these tools, creating the situations as Polar Code requires. 
 
The effects of icing did not cause loss of stability for studied passenger vessel or bulk 
carrier. However naval frigate did not fulfill all stability criteria when it was studied with 
in light loading condition and ice accretion. As naval ships are not designed solely 
according to IMO rules, the result does not indicate directly, should the effect ice 
accretion be accepted or not. Still, a conclusion can be made that smaller vessels are more 
vulnerable for icing than larger ships, as the studied naval ship is smallest of the three 
ships studied, being at 140 m in length, compared to the bulker (220 m) and the passenger 
ship (240 m). The conclusion is also supported by literature, were the icing was most 
critical for small fishing vessels at typical size of 100 m in length. Using 10 times larger 
values for ice accretion the results revealed that the studied passenger ship and naval 
frigate were failing in some of the intact stability criteria studied. However it can be 
argued how reasonable it is that a 240 meter-long passenger ship will have 30 cm thick 
layer of ice on all exposed deck areas and 8 cm of ice on lateral areas. The study of uneven 
icing indicated that such situation is not clearly more critical for any of the ships studied, 
supporting thus the validity of the current ice accretion definition in Polar Code. 
 
The effect of damage stability was studied only with a 240 meter-long passenger vessel, 
designed already in 2009. The number of case studies was limited since as it was found 
difficult to obtain several realistic ship models. However the studied ship was one of the 
most interesting, since it is quite average-sized and single hull, describing rather well 
typical expedition ship. The study aimed to reveal how capable existing ships are under 
the deterministic damage scenario as defined in Polar Code. The passenger ship failed to 
meet the damage stability criteria on 13 of the 240 relevant damage scenarios, meaning 
the studied ship would not fulfill the Polar Code requirement. 
 77 
 
 
As a conclusion, existing ships or category C ships are possibly vulnerable for the damage 
scenario defined in Polar Code. Following only SOLAS 2009 requirements in polar ship 
design for new ships, may lead to difficulties when gaining Polar Ship Certificate. 
Especially openings in the compartments close to waterline are potentially critical. The 
interpretation of polar code is still somewhat unclear as there is very limited amount of 
official documentation for interpretation or example cases available. The identification of 
the state of Polar Code is also one major outcome of the study, suggesting there is still 
work in the future to clarify the requirements for ship builders and the industry. 
 
As for future work, there exists also possibilities for improving the tool to identify the 
relevant damage cases. For example topology-based approach could be applied for 
identifying the relevant damage cases. This would enable better filtering accuracy for 
complex-shaped rooms since the actual geometry of rooms is applied directly to study 
does the ‘damage-box’ fit inside in the damaged compartments, and is it forming a subset 
of those compartments which would include parts of all compartments involved. For the 
rule clarification most important would be to define how the damage extents should be 
measured, explaining also why the normal direction is applied for penetration value. 
 
Part of the future work would also to study the effects of ice related damage stability 
requirements of the Polar Code with some 3D ship model of actual existing ship. This 
would provide more solid evidence on the matter of safety of existing and category C 
ships in polar waters. Also statement should be made, does both intact and damage 
stability requirements need be taken into account at same time. Also the suggested idea 
of decreasing speeds of passenger vessels at areas with higher probability of ice, could be 
worth studying more in the future. 
 
With these results and presented back ground of research and older rules, the stability 
related chapter of the Polar Code appears to be somewhat adequate set of rules for vessels 
sailing in polar areas, but is also found to be partly unclear and not thoroughly 
explainable, about on what the requirements are based on. The design values used for ice 
accretion on ship structures can be considered to be not very conservative with the 
evidence presented in this study. Also the interpretation of the damage dimensions 
orientation would benefit from more detailed explanation in the rule text. 
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Appendix 2. Damage stability calculation results for 
example ship FLOODSTAND-B 
 
 
CASE: DS represents the used loading condition, in which ship is floating at designed   
subdivision draught. 
RANGESOL: Range from zero-heel to immersion of first relevant opening per SOLAS 
HEEL: Heel of the ship at equilibrium after damage 
GZMAXR: Maximum GZ from equilibrium to flooding 
GZMAXS: Maximum GZ for s factor calculation 
SFACSOL: S factor by SOLAS II-1 
STAT: Status of stability criteria (OK/NOT MEET) 
OPEN: Critical opening 
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Port side results, including side and bottom area damages. 
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Starboard side results, including side and bottom area damages. 
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Appendix 3. Interview at Aker Arctic Ltd. 
 
Aker Arctic is one of the world leading ship design office for ice going ships. The ship 
designers interviewed at Aker Arctic on 26.01.2017 were naval architect, senior project 
manager Mr. Mika Hovilainen and senior project manager Mr. Maximillian Vocke. 
 
The Scope behind the interview of the industry is to highlight how the ships intended for 
polar water operations were designed before the Polar Code, and how the new Polar Code 
has changed the situation. The interviews may also reveal demands or useful details that 
need to be considered in stability –tool development.  
 
The review was carried with 10 questions, and also by open questions and discussion. 
The list of questions and refracted answers are shown below this text. 
 
Questions for Aker Arctic 
1. In general, what new aspects the Polar Code brings to arctic ship design? 
What is old and what is new? 
2. Is there something against common sense or odd? 
3. What are especially good safety increasing regulations, not considered before? 
4. How you have considered icing in your past ship designs? How it is 
implemented to stability study/criteria? 
5. How is the damage stability calculated before? Especially how damage 
generation is carried out/was there some deterministic damage scenario? 
6. Are you aware where the extent of the deterministic damage comes from/its 
reasons? 
a. legnth, height? 
b. penetration (76cm?) 
7. How you feel this is in line with damage statistics from polar area operations? 
8. Have you ideas/notes for the stability tool in question in the thesis? 
9. What kind of NAPA-model would be interesting and good for the analysis? 
10. Questions for the thesis and discussion. 
 
The answers for questions above questions were following. The answers do not represent 
the answers from the interview word-by-word, but are summarized by the context of the 
interview. The recording of the interview is available from the author. 
 
Answers: 
 
1. In general, what new aspects the Polar Code brings to arctic ship design? 
What is old and what is new? 
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A: Before Polar Code there has been similar requirements called IMO Resolution 
A.1024(26), Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. Similar damage stability 
requirements exists already in A.1026. Polar Code brings more awareness and require-
ments related to special circumstances that can happen these sea areas. In these areas 
ships are far away from help. At the moment there is no clear requirement how long 
time in the polar area the ship has to be designed, before rescue arrives. Designs can 
vary from 5 to 60 days to provide safety for the crew and passengers to wait for the help 
to arrive. The stability related chapter in Polar Code is the only clearly defined require-
ments with clear limits and definitions. 
 
2. Is there something against common sense or odd? 
A: The amount of icing that can accumulate on superstructure is rather small. In the 
past projects Aker Arctic has used higher values for ice accumulating in the past ship 
designs. Also the general feeling towards Polar Code was that it is too indefinite 
because there is too much interpretation for the requirements.  
 
3. What are especially good safety increasing regulations, not considered before? 
Most part of the Polar Code requirements are such which have been taken into account 
in ship design already before Polar Code. One particular improvement in Polar Code 
to previous situation is how the ship is prepared for evacuation in remote and harsh 
conditions. Special equipment and procedures for such event improves possibility to 
survive. Other improvement from previous A.1024 requirement is that Polar Code does 
not anymore require the study of peaching and ship strength in that situation. For long 
vessels such as tankers and cargo ships that sort of situation is impossible since no ice 
can with stand such pressure caused by the ship bow rising on the ice. 
 
4. How you have considered icing in your past ship designs? How it is 
implemented to stability study/criteria? 
A: For icebreakers and cargo ships the icing is not considered as a problem because of 
the relatively high GM that allows some added mass to be placed on high coordinates. 
For cruise ships, the effect of icing can potentially be more significant. Cruise ships GM 
is smaller to ensure passenger comfort with slow accelerations. So accumulated ice on 
high decks that may have plenty of possible deck area for ice to accumulate can have 
effect on vessels intact stability. 
 
5. How is the intact stability concerning icing calculated before? 
A: Side projection and exposed deck area has usually been taken from CAD drawing as 
well as the CoG/geometrical center points for these areas. Then with these information 
it is quite straight forward to calculate total CoG of the accumulated ice. This approach 
is at least efficient for cargo ships, which has rather simple superstructure. More 
automated and possibly NAPA model utilizing method could be useful with cruise ships 
that have more complicated superstructure and many decks. 
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In the past classification societies have required larger ice loads to be used. For 
example on decks 300kg/m^2, not 30kg/m^2 as in Polar Code and IS code (IMO IS 
Code). Also in ship design and stability calculations, it has been common practice to 
round up the deck areas and thus also the amount accumulated ice, to have 
conservative estimation for the extra mass. Also the Polar Code instructs to use certain 
percentages to increase the amount of accumulated ice, as the IS Code in the past. 
 
6. How the authorities validate and interprets the Polar Code requirements from 
ship designs? 
A: Not that much. Design features and needed information shall be written to the Polar 
Water Operational Manual (aka PWOM) and the class society or statutory authority 
stamps the manual to confirm that Polar Code’s design aspects and requirements has 
been taken account. At the moment, the organization who gives insurance for the ship 
and operator may be the most interested in about how the vessel fulfills the Polar Code 
requirements. Especially if accident happens and it is time, find the reason for the 
accident. At the moment it seems like no-one is clearly appointed to be the supervisor of 
the interpretation of Polar Code. This allows ship designers or owners to interpret the 
Polar Code as lightly as possible and thus find ways to save money with the cost of 
compromising the safety. 
 
7. How is the damage stability calculated before? Especially how damage 
generation is carried out/was there some deterministic damage scenario? 
A: Aker Arctic typically designs all ice going ships with double sides that are usually 
around 1m wide. Damages are generated manually, which is already quite laborious 
with icebreakers and cargo ships. In case of arctic cruise ship, automatized generation 
is surely very useful. The damage extent as defined in the Polar Code is sensible. The 
penetration depth of 760mm is conservative, for damages they have heard of to be 
caused by ice compression or ramming. Idea of ice caused damages is already familiar 
and used by (some?) class-rules and especially Russian register that is quite similar to 
Polar Code. Supply vessel rules has some statistic for determining the 760mm damage 
penetration. Aker Arctic/they were not familiar with an accident where double side 
would have been punctured. In addition, 760mm double side is very tight in 
construction point of view. 
 
8. Are you aware where the extent of the deterministic damage comes from/its 
reasons? 
a. Length, height? 
A: Sensible dimensions. 
 
b. Penetration (76cm?) 
A: Maybe used already in some supply vessel code. Mentioned in year 2002 
guidelines for arctic/polar ship design. 
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9. How you feel this is in line with damage statistics from polar area operations? 
A: Typical damages in ice does not influence flooding. Plate is typically bended 
without more severe failure. If more severe failure happens, most propbably it is 
within current damage extentions. 
 
10. Have you ideas/notes for the stability tool in question in the thesis? 
A: In intact stability calculation the maximum loading condition is not necessarily 
the most dangerous situation. So it might be good to put the effect of icing to the 
limit curve, not to loading conditions. 
 
 
 
11. What kind of NAPA-model would be interesting and good for the analysis? 
A: Aker’s ships not that interesting since all have double side. Possibly some cruise 
ship would be interesting and make it have a damage at the intersection of four 
watertight zones. This would be interesting and quite possible scenario 
 
12. General discussion and thoughts 
A: Polar Code could be developed to have more accurately defined requirements, 
now there is too much space for interpretation that may lead to decrease in safety. 
Every ship designer should be able to come up to similar outcome with same rules. 
The responsibility of supervision of how Polar Code is fulfilled in ship designs 
should be assigned clearly to some authority. 
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Appendix 4. List of intact stability criteria and results for 
used example ships 
 
FLOODSTAND-B 
 
Light loading condition with ice: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ     ATTV UNIT STAT       
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve.    0.055    0.306  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve.    0.090    0.445  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .    0.030    0.139  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    0.957  m      OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000  28.512 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    2.390  m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000    1.771  deg   OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning   10.000    2.558  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    1.155        OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000    5.034  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   26.392    5.034  deg    OK        
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Heavy loading condition with ice: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ     ATTV UNIT STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve .    0.055    0.333  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090    0.506  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .    0.030    0.173  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    1.135  m      OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000   30.477 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    2.488  m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000  1.553  deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning   10.000    2.357  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    1.839        OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000    3.530  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   24.685    3.530  deg    OK        
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Light loading condition with 10X larger icing: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR              TEXT                                REQ    ATTV UNIT  STAT       
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30        Area under GZ curve.   0.055    0.111   mrad  OK        
V.AREA40        Area under GZ curve. 0.090    0.138   mrad  OK        
V.AREA3040    Area under GZ curve  0.030    0.026   mrad  NOT MET   
V.GZ0.2           Min. GZ > 0.2                    0.200    0.364   m       OK        
V.MAXGZ25       Max. GZ at an angle.     25.000  27.587 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15        GM > 0.15 m                      0.150    0.765   m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASS Max. heel due to crowding 10.000   4.700  deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURN Max. heel due to turning          10.000   8.199  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER  IMO weather criterion              1.000     0.525            NOT MET   
LR.IMOWINDHEEL1HEEL < 16 deg                      16.000   10.203 deg   OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL2HEEL < 80% of FRB im.       22.971   10.203 deg   OK        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Unsymmetrical icing on P-side of the ship, as per PC: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ    ATTV UNIT  STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve .    0.055    0.297   mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090    0.439   mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .    0.030    0.142   mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    0.965   m        OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000  28.758 deg     OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    2.506   m        OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to cro.   10.000  2.769   deg     OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to tur.   10.000  3.491   deg     OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    1.267              OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000  5.041   deg     OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   26.502  5.041   deg     OK        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
Bulk Carrier 
 
Light loading condition with ice: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ     ATTV UNIT STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30  Area under GZ curve .    0.055    0.509  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090    1.036  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .    0.030    0.527  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    3.506  m      OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .  25.000   46.320 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    3.723  m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000    3.948   deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning   10.000    6.502   deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO  weather criterion    1.000    8.446        OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg          16.000    4.196   deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.  22.061    4.196   deg    OK        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Heavy loading condition with ice: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ     ATTV UNIT STAT       
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve .    0.055    0.429  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090    0.749  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .   0.030    0.321  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    1.941  m      OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000   43.312 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    3.669  m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000    3.005  deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning.   10.000    6.033  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    4.430        OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000    3.059  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   12.480    3.059  deg    OK        
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Light loading condition with 10X higher icing allowance: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR              TEXT                                REQ              ATTV UNIT  STAT 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30        Area under GZ curve.    0.055    0.465    mrad  OK        
V.AREA40        Area under GZ curve.    0.090    0.952    mrad  OK        
V.AREA3040      Area under GZ curve.    0.030   0.487    mrad  OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2                     0.200    3.213    m       OK        
V.MAXGZ25       Max. GZ at an angle.     25.000   45.690  deg    OK        
V.GM0.15        GM > 0.15 m                       0.150    3.396    m       OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASS Max. heel due to crowding   10.000    4.208    deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURN Max. heel due to turning          10.000    7.106    deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER  IMO weather criterion              1.000    8.678              OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL1HEEL < 16 deg                     16.000    4.360    deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL2HEEL < 80% of FRB im       21.557    4.360    deg    OK        
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Unsymmetrical icing on P-side of the ship, as per PC: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR              TEXT                                 REQ    ATTV UNIT  STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30        Area under GZ curve 0.055     0.514  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve  0.090     1.049  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040      Area under GZ curve. 0.030     0.535  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2                    0.200     3.570   m        OK        
V.MAXGZ25       Max. GZ at an angle.     25.000   46.507 deg     OK        
V.GM0.15        GM > 0.15 m                      0.150     3.811   m       OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASS Max. heel due to crowding 10.000   4.131    deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURN Max. heel due to turning          10.000   6.572    deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER  IMO weather criterion              1.000     8.435              OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL1HEEL < 16 deg                     16.000   4.277     deg   OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL2HEEL < 80% of FRB im.       22.184   4.277     deg   OK        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Naval Frigate 
 
Light loading condition with ice: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ    ATTV UNIT STAT       
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve .    0.055   0.033 mrad    NOT MET   
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090   0.073 mrad    NOT MET   
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .    0.030   0.040 mrad    OK   
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2           0.200   0.301 m         OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000  41.616 deg   OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150   0.221 m         OK   
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000  11.215 deg   NOT MET   
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning   10.000   0.000 deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    1.581            OK  
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000  23.902 deg   NOT MET   
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   28.656  23.902 deg   OK  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Heavy loading condition with ice: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR             TEXT                       REQ     ATTV UNIT STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30       Area under GZ curve .    0.055    0.131  mrad   OK        
V.AREA40       Area under GZ curve .    0.090    0.247  mrad   OK        
V.AREA3040     Area under GZ curve .   0.030    0.116  mrad   OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2            0.200    0.796  m      OK        
V.MAXGZ25      Max. GZ at an angle .   25.000   43.447 deg    OK        
V.GM0.15       GM > 0.15 m              0.150    0.900  m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASSMax. heel due to crowding   10.000    2.394  deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURNMax. heel due to turning   10.000    0.000  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER IMO weather criterion    1.000    5.714        OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 16 deg           16.000    5.127  deg    OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEE.HEEL < 80% of FRB im.   25.834    5.127  deg    OK        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Light loading condition with 10X higher icing allowance: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR              TEXT                                 REQ    ATTV UNIT  STAT       
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30        Area under GZ curve.    0.055     0.000   mrad  NOT MET   
V.AREA40        Area under GZ curve.    0.090     0.001   mrad  NOT MET   
V.AREA3040      Area under GZ curve.    0.030     0.001   mrad  NOT MET   
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2                     0.200     0.013   m       NOT MET   
V.MAXGZ25       Max. GZ at an angle 25.000   38.323 deg     OK        
V.GM0.15        GM > 0.15 m                      0.150    -0.235   m       NOT MET   
LR.MAXHEELPASS   Max. heel due to crowding.   10.000       -      deg     NOT MET   
LR.MAXHEELTURN Max. heel due to turning          10.000  34.638 deg     NOT MET   
LR.IMOWEATHER  IMO weather criterion              1.000    0.000              NOT MET   
LR.IMOWINDHEEL1HEEL < 16 deg                     16.000       -      deg     NOT MET   
LR.IMOWINDHEEL2HEEL < 80% of FRB im       25.987       -      deg     NOT MET   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Unsymmetrical icing on P-side of the ship, as per PC: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RCR              TEXT                                 REQ    ATTV UNIT  STAT       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
V.AREA30        Area under GZ curve.    0.055    0.020    mrad  NOT MET   
V.AREA40        Area under GZ curve.    0.090    0.057    mrad  NOT MET   
V.AREA3040      Area under GZ curve.    0.030    0.037    mrad  OK        
V.GZ0.2         Min. GZ > 0.2                    0.200    0.290    m       OK        
V.MAXGZ25       Max. GZ at an angle.     25.000  41.990  deg    OK        
V.GM0.15        GM > 0.15 m                      0.150    0.253    m      OK        
LR.MAXHEELPASS    Max. heel due to crowding.    10.000  9.312    deg    OK        
LR.MAXHEELTURN  Max. heel due to turning    0.000    9.312    deg    OK        
LR.IMOWEATHER  IMO weather criterion              1.000    1.252              OK        
LR.IMOWINDHEEL1HEEL < 16 deg                     16.000  27.334  deg    NOT MET   
LR.IMOWINDHEEL2HEEL < 80% of FRB im.       28.484  27.334  deg    OK        
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 5. Example output of results, produced by the 
developed ice accretion tool. 
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Appendix 6. Subdivision of test-case ship POLARTEST 
 
Test case ship POLARTEST watertight subdivision used in the tool verification. 
 
Above: profile, deck 5 and deck 4. 
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Above: deck 3, deck 2 and deck 1 (double bottom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
